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The Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay 'just compensation"
when it takes private property through eminent domain. Prominent scholars,
however, have argued that optimally the government would pay nothingfor taken
property. Treating takings compensation as a form of government-provided
insurance, they argue that owners should be left to purchase that insurance from
private companies. This fundamental challenge to the conventional
understanding of takings law is now common in economically influenced
analyses of eminent domain. It routinely appears in leading casebooks, and it
has significant practical implications for interpreting the scope of the Takings
Clause. This Article addresses the anti-compensation challenge on both
economic and justice grounds. It makes three main arguments: First, standard
justifications for requiring government compensation in fact are ineffective
against this anti-compensation challenge. Ifthose established justifications were
the only relevant considerations, then the challenge would actually be quite
plausible. Second, the challenge nevertheless is unpersuasive. Both the standard
justifications for requiring government compensation and the arguments
challenging that requirement have overlooked the importance of a distinct form
of justice-what this Article terms "relational justice." Recognizing justice's
relational dimension both reveals the fundamental error in considering takings
compensation to be a form ofgovernment-provided insurance and explains why
justice requires that the government pay that compensation. Third, there is no
need here to choose between relational justice and economic efficiency, because
the efficiency concerns motivating the anti-compensation challenge are illusory.
Existing scholarship has failed to consider the size of the inefficiencies that the
challenge alleges exist. This Article remedies that crucial gap in the literature,
showing why any net social efficiency gains from replacing government
compensation with private insurance would likely be negligible at best, and
possibly negative. Thus, efficiency offers no reason to disregard the requirements
ofrelational justice.
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Introduction
The basic principles governing the power of eminent domain might
seem so well established by now as to be beyond controversy: the
government may confiscate private property for public use but must
compensate the owner for the value of what the government took. Those rules
have been part of the U.S. Constitution since the enactment of the Fifth
Amendment's "Takings Clause," which declares "nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation," and many state
constitutions contain similar provisions.' A long line of U.S. Supreme Court
cases has emphasized that the Takings Clause's "just compensation"
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For examples of state constitution provisions, see CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 19, cl. a ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation,
ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner."); MASS.
CONST. art. 10 ("And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual
should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor."); N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. a ("Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.").
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requirement mandates that the government pay "a full and exact equivalent"
in value for the seized property.2
Yet in recent decades prominent scholars have argued that the
government should not be obligated to compensate for taken property at all.'
Building upon an idea, common in economic analyses of eminent domain,
that takings compensation is a form of government-provided insurance, these
scholars argue that leaving property owners to purchase that insurance from
private companies would benefit society by reducing both "moral hazard"-
distortions in landowners' incentives to improve their property-and
administrative costs. Today the case against compensation-for
convenience, one might call it the "anti-compensation thesis"-is a staple of
many economically influenced analyses of takings law, and it routinely
appears in leading casebooks.4
The influence of these arguments may, at first glance, seem surprising,
since the government's explicit constitutional obligation to pay
compensation for taken property seems unlikely to be repealed.5 In fact,
however, the issues raised by the anti-compensation thesis are pivotal for
understanding eminent domain for two reasons.
The first reason is practical. Although the Takings Clause requires
payment of "just compensation," the scope of the Takings Clause's
2. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (reading
the Fifth Amendment as "a declaration, that no private property shall be appropriated to public uses
unless a full and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner"); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S.
246, 254-55 (1934) (endorsing the Monongahela Navigation Co. court's statement).
3. See infra Part 1.
4. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127-34
(2004) (discussing arguments for and against governmental compensation and concluding that the
argument in favor of compensation "is significantly qualified ... by questions concerning whether
the actual incentives of the state to take are excessive and by related issues"); see also Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 393 (2000) ("From an efficiency perspective, a rule of no compensation
seems at least as plausible as a rule of full or partial government compensation."). For examples of
casebook discussions, see, for example, JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1064 (7th ed. 2010)
(noting the debate about whether private insurance is a preferable alternative to public compensation
and commenting that it, "so far as we know, remains unresolved"); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI
L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 175-78 (2d ed. 2000) (excerpting a
seminal article on the topic and discussing the issue more generally); THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1169 (3d ed. 2017) (noting literature
identifying potential obstacles to the availability of private insurance against takings losses but
commenting that "[i]n theory ... if these problems could somehow be overcome, private insurance
would do the trick just fine"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 73 (8th ed.
2011) (discussing the question: "Why not just let property owners insure the market value of their
property against the risk of its being taken by eminent domain?").
5. If the taken property is owned by a foreign national, expropriating it without paying
compensation might also violate international law. See, e.g., G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a
Taking ofProperly Under International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 307 (1962) (noting that
there exists a "widely recognized rule of international law that the property of aliens cannot normally
be taken, whether for public purposes or not, without adequate compensation").
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application is still very much contested.' The Clause itself does not indicate
exactly what sorts of government actions qualify as "takings" and therefore
are bound by the Clause's "public use" and "just compensation"
requirements.7 Thus, courts continue to confront questions about whether
certain physical interferences with possession are takings, as well as whether
certain regulations are takings.8 Nor have courts established a canonical
definition of "property" for constitutional purposes, and even the U.S.
Supreme Court has, in different cases, defined property in ways that are in
tension with each other.' As a result, the set of circumstances requiring "just
compensation" can expand or contract.' 0
If the anti-compensation thesis is correct that ideally the government
would never pay for property that it takes, then courts' adopting very
restrictive criteria for what constitutes "property" or a "taking"-and thus for
when "just compensation" is owed-would be reasonable, indeed advisable.
Alternatively, if those arguments are not plausible, then the theoretical
availability of private insurance for takings losses offers no reason to adopt a
narrow view of the Takings Clause's scope.
Likewise, the Takings Clause does not specify the amount of
compensation that constitutes "just compensation." Although the U.S.
Supreme Court understands "just compensation" to mean fair-market-value
compensation, that interpretation establishes merely a constitutional
minimum.II Congress and individual states are free to provide a higher level
of compensation, and in many cases they do.' 2 If, however, the anti-
compensation thesis is correct, then the optimal amount of compensation is
zero, and, consequently, laws that increase takings compensation are
unnecessary at best, and harmful at worst.
6. For a survey of the key arguments and issues, see generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W.
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 58-168 (2002).
7. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape ofConstitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 891
& n.17 (2000) (noting that "there is an enormous literature about what it means to 'take' property"
and collecting sources).
8. For a prominent recent dispute over whether a particular physical interference constitutes a
taking, see Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 515 (2012) (holding that
repeated temporary flooding of private property is "not categorically exempt from Takings Clause
liability"). For an overview of regulatory takings, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 121-68.
9. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 889-90 (discussing four inconsistent Supreme Court cases and
noting that "not one of the four decisions makes any reference to any of the others, or makes any
effort to integrate its innovations ... into the preexisting fabric of the law").
10. For a description of the evolution of the meaning of "property," see 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 5.08 (2016). See also Maureen E. Brady, Property's Ceiling: State Courts and the
Expansion of Takings Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1174 (2016) (describing courts'
expansion of the definition of "property" to provide a right of compensation in "street grade" cases).
11. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (determining that a property owner
is entitled to the "fair market value" of the property taken).
12. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy ofEminentDomain, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 101, 121 (2006) (noting that, as a result of various statutory provisions, "[flrequently,
owners are legally entitled to substantially more than the fair market value of their property").
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Beyond these practical considerations, the anti-compensation thesis also
has fundamental implications for the basic principles of takings law. The
challenge that the thesis poses to standard justifications for requiring
government compensation reveals a critical gap in contemporary
understandings of eminent domain's normative foundations. This Article
aims to remedy that gap.
This Article has three major contentions: First, although the anti-
compensation thesis may seem startling, the standard justifications for
requiring takings compensation struggle to meet its challenge. If those
established justifications were the only relevant considerations, then the anti-
compensation thesis would actually be quite plausible.
Second, the thesis nevertheless is false. Contrary to what economic
analyses of eminent domain commonly assume, takings compensation and
insurance are fundamentally distinct because they involve importantly
different relationships between the party suffering a loss and the party paying
"compensation" to alleviate that loss. When property is taken, the
relationship among the property's owner, the community that took the
property, and the entity that pays compensation involves a specific type of
justice, a type that this Article calls "relational justice." This sort of justice is
distinct from other forms of justice common in legal scholarship-such as
distributive justice, procedural justice, and corrective justice-and it has been
overlooked in existing literature on eminent domain. This Article argues that
recognizing the relevance of relational justice, and what this Article terms the
"duties of reasonable accommodation" that it imposes, shows how the
government's paying compensation for taken property has an irreplaceable
role in legitimizing exercises of eminent domain.
Third, there is no need to choose between relational justice and
economic efficiency, because the economic-efficiency concerns that
motivate the anti-compensation thesis are illusory. Although proponents of
the anti-compensation thesis have carefully argued that government
compensation for takings creates inefficiencies, they have paid remarkably
little attention to assessing the size of those alleged inefficiencies. This
Article remedies that crucial gap in the existing literature, arguing that any
such inefficiencies are likely to be negligible and that their net total may even
be negative. Thus, economic efficiency considerations offer no reason to
disregard the requirements of relational justice.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the two standard
arguments in favor of replacing government compensation with private
insurance and then examines how they do, or could, respond to standard
justifications that scholarship has identified for requiring government
compensation. Part II develops the argument that relational justice requires
government compensation. The discussion begins by identifying a critical
oversight in the assumption that takings compensation is merely a form of
government-provided insurance. It then analyzes the common
2019] 939
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characterization of takings as "forced sales," bringing to light the
indispensable role that compensation plays in making a transfer of ownership
legitimate. Part II next addresses the implications of the fact that even though
exercises of eminent domain are coercive, they are not wrongful. It then
explains why relational justice does not require that the government
compensate for every burden that it imposes-that is, for every cost of "legal
transitions"--and why taxation and takings are fundamentally distinct.
Part III reexamines the economic case for the anti-compensation thesis,
arguing that the supposed efficiency gains from replacing government
compensation with private insurance are likely to be negligible at best, and
thus they provide no reason to disregard the requirements of relational justice.
Part IV concludes.
I. The Case Against Compensation
The first step toward evaluating the anti-compensation thesis is
understanding its foundations. Historically, the case against requiring
compensation for taken property has rested on two concerns, one involving
"moral hazard," the other focusing on administrative costs. These arguments
run squarely contrary to the standard justifications that existing literature has
offered for requiring government compensation. This Part will survey both
competing sets of arguments and examine how the anti-compensation
thesis's defenders respond, or could respond, to the standard justifications for
requiring government compensation. The responses available to the anti-
compensation thesis will, perhaps surprisingly, prove largely effective
against the standard justifications for requiring compensation. If those
justifications were the only relevant considerations, then the anti-
compensation thesis would have at least prima facie plausibility. This
conclusion then sets the stage for Parts II and m, which will show why that
superficial plausibility does not survive closer examination.
A. The Core Case
The roots of the anti-compensation thesis lie in Lawrence Blume and
Daniel Rubinfeld's seminal article providing "an economic analysis of
compensation as a form of insurance."13 The basic structure of this analysis
is simple. Claims for takings compensation arise from the losses that owners
of taken property suffer because their property has become more valuable to
society as a component of some public project than it would have been in the
owners' hands. In this respect, losing one's property to an exercise of eminent
domain might seem similar to losing it to any other event that is beyond the
13. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CALF. L. REV. 569, 571 (1984).
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owner's control, such as a fire or a natural disaster. 14 Meanwhile, the taken
property's owner has already been paying to the government, in the form of
higher taxes, the sums needed to make the general system of takings
compensation possible." On this analysis, these tax payments are analogous
to the premiums paid to purchase private insurance against a loss, and the
government's paying compensation is analogous to payment of an insurance
claim for that loss.16 Treating the "just compensation" requirement in this
way as a form of government-provided insurance is now common even
among scholars who do not go on to advocate replacing government
compensation with private insurance."'
This insurance-based conception of takings compensation sometimes
takes the form of assertions that such compensation is merely one species of
a broader general category of "transition relief"-that is, compensation from
the government for costs that individuals suffer as a result of some legal
change." The fact that legal change is pervasive and routinely results in
individuals' suffering losses for which they receive no compensation then
raises the question of why takings losses should be singled out to receive
public compensation when other legal-transition losses do not." Some
commentators go even further, arguing that takings losses are fundamentally
no different from losses caused by any of the myriad factors that affect
14. See. e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509,534-35 (1986) ("A private actor should be indifferent as to whether a given probability of loss
will result from the action of competitors, an act of govermnent, or an act of God, except to the
extent that the source of the risk will affect the likelihood of compensation or other relief.").
15. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 128 (noting that "through payment of higher taxes to
finance compensation for takings, individuals must implicitly pay exactly the premium they would
be charged for private insurance coverage against takings").
16. See, e.g., id ("[O]ther things being equal, there is an equivalence between the state paying
compensation in the event of takings and individuals purchasing insurance coverage against
uncompensated takings."); Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 590-92 (arguing that
"compensation, provided ex post, acts as a rudimentary form of insurance").
17. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings
Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1711 (2010) ("In essence, by paying compensation to owners
any time it takes their property, the government grants all property owners a publicly provided
insurance policy against the risk of future takings of their property."); Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 282 (1992) ("In effect, [the citizen] is
buying insurance against a taking . . . .").
18. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DuKE L.J. 1285, 1316 (2011) ("Transition
relief-such as grandfathering, recognition of vested rights, or compensation for governmental
takings-amounts to embedded insurance against legal change.").
19. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 14, at 563 (asserting that determining "what constitutes a
taking for constitutional purposes ... has long been recognized as a central difficulty in takings
doctrine, which attempts to limit the constitutional requirement of just compensation to a small
subset of the diminutions in value that can result from government action" (footnote omitted)).
2019] 941
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property's value, including factors that have nothing to do with government
action, none of which are accompanied by government compensation.20
Having thus conceived of takings compensation as merely a form of
government-provided insurance against one particular type of risk among
many similar types of risk, the canonical case for the anti-compensation
thesis then argues that providing this insurance would optimally be left to the
private market.2 1 This conclusion rests on two grounds: a concern that the
availability of government compensation biases property owners' incentives
in a socially inefficient direction, and a concern about unnecessarily large
administrative costs. Each concern can be briefly summarized.
1. Avoiding Moral Hazard.-If takings compensation is a form of
insurance, then it is natural to worry that its availability may create a "moral
hazard." That is, it may encourage the insured to act in ways that increase the
risk of socially undesirable results.22 The specific hazard attributed to takings
compensation is an increased risk that landowners will make excessive
improvements to their property, improvements that will go to waste if the
government takes the property for a public project that has no use for that
improvement.3
A simple hypothetical example can make the problem clear. Suppose
that an owner is considering improving her property and that the
improvement will cost $4,000 to construct. Assuming that she is
economically rational, she will make the improvement only if the payoff for
20. See, e.g., id. at 534 (asserting that "none of the distinctions [that commentators] offer for
treating government and market risks differently withstands scrutiny").
21. Two articles were seminal in creating the canonical case: Lawrence Blume, Daniel L.
Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J.
ECON. 71 (1984); and Louis Kaplow, An EconomicAnalysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509 (1986).
22. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE
PROPERTY, PUBLIC USE 86 (2011) (noting that "[flrom a purely economic perspective" the anti-
compensation argument "is not a particularly surprising one considering that it is a simple
application of well-known results from the economics of insurance," specifically moral hazard). For
a succinct explanation of moral hazard as a general problem in insurance, see ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAs ULEN, LAW & EcONOMICs 238 (6th ed. 2012).
23. See Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 81 (arguing that private investors "do[]
not take into account the loss to society if the project is undertaken and the capital invested in ...
land is lost"); Kaplow, supra note 14, at 539-40 (arguing that full compensation for takings leads
to overinvestment by landowners). Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro's paper appeared a decade after
William Baxter and Lillian Altree had published a related argument, in a somewhat different
context, about distorted incentives for improving property when conflicts between land uses might
arise. William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects ofAirport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5-
6 (1972). For a succinct technical exposition of the moral hazard concern, see Daniel Klerman,
Comment, Takings, Fiscal Illusion, and the Median Voter, 173 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THBEORETICAL
ECON. 71, 72-73 (2017).
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doing so is greater than $4,000.24 Further suppose that she concludes that the
improvement would offer a payoff of $5,000 over its lifespan.2 5 Ordinarily,
one would expect her to make the investment (unless an even better
investment opportunity presents itself) and that doing so would increase the
total amount of wealth in society by $1,000. In other words, her making the
investment would be socially efficient.
But now add to this picture the possibility that the government might
exercise its power of eminent domain over her property. Suppose that there
is a 50% chance that the government will take her property to build an airport
and that the government's doing so would itself substantially increase total
social wealth. For the sake of simplicity, assume that if the taking occurs, it
will occur immediately after the owner has finished constructing the
improvement.
In this revised scenario, the owner's building the improvement would
no longer be socially efficient. The mathematically expected value of the
improvement's payoff would now be only $2,500 because there is now a 50%
chance that the improvement will actually return zero rather than the $5,000
that is hoped.26 Meanwhile, constructing the improvement would still cost
$4,000. Thus, the net expected return from building the improvement would
be negative: - $1,500.
If the government pays no compensation for the property that it takes,
then a rational owner will make this same calculation herself, realize that the
mathematically expected outcome of making the improvement is a personal
loss of $1,500, and choose to invest her $4,000 somewhere more profitable.
The course of action that is personally best for her and the socially efficient
course of action are the same.
However, the argument continues, this synchronization of personal
advantage and social efficiency ceases if the government fully compensates
owners for the value of taken property.27 For if the government reimburses
24. Strictly speaking, she will do so only if the payoff is sufficiently above $4,000 that no
alternative opportunity would offer her an even greater payoff for her $4,000 investment That minor
complication does not affect the substance of the example.
25. Again, speaking strictly, the example supposes that $5,000 is the present value of all future
payoffs from the investment. For a succinct discussion of present-value calculations, see COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 22, at 37.
26. The expected value of an event with an uncertain outcome is determined by multiplying the
probability of each possible outcome by the payoff that would result if that outcome becomes actual,
and then summing all of those products. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 43. Thus, in this
example, the expected value of building the improvement would be (0.5X$5,000) + (0.5)($0) =
$2,500.
27. See SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 131 (arguing that full compensation may "excessive[ly]
incentivize [individuals] to invest in improving their property" and lead to "socially undesirable"
results); Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 81, 88 (arguing that full compensation
leaves land owners with little incentive to account for the risk of a taking and that in some instances
no compensation may be more desirable).
9432019]
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owners for the value of any taken improvements, then an owner who is
deciding whether to invest in an improvement will, quite rationally, pay no
attention to the probability of the property's being taken. In this example, if
the property is not taken, then the owner would receive $5,000 in value from
enjoying the effect of the improvement on her property, and if the property
is taken, then she would receive $5,000 in compensation from the
government. Either way, she receives $5,000 in return from a $4,000
investment. Hence, she will choose to make the investment, even though, as
noted a moment ago, doing so imposes a $1,500 expected loss on society.
The decision that is most advantageous to her now differs from the socially
efficient decision. Therefore, this argument concludes, the government's
paying compensation for taken property produces inefficient incentives to
overinvest in improvements that will go to waste if the improved property is
taken.28
By contrast, leaving a property owner to rely on private insurance for
reimbursement of the value of taken property would avoid this hazard
because the price charged by private companies to insure against takings
would depend on both the value of the insured property and the risk of a loss.
As a result, insurance would become more expensive if an improvement
increased the insured property's value or if a substantial risk arose that the
property might be taken.29 This increase in insurance premiums would
encourage owners to take account of the risk of a taking-i.e., to "internalize"
that risk-and thus to make the socially optimal decision when deciding
whether to improve their property.30 The ultimate effect, the argument
concludes, would be to avoid the "moral hazard" that leads to a socially
inefficient result when the government pays compensation.
28. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 541 (arguing that "[flull compensation is ... undesirable
whenever the market would not have provided full protection").
29. For a brief discussion of how insurance firms determine how much to charge for insurance,
see ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 7 (2d ed.
2005).
30. In the hypothetical example above, requiring the owner to purchase private insurance for
protection against takings losses would add the cost of insurance premiums to the contemplated
improvement's $4,000 cost of construction, and that extra cost would increase as the chance of the
property's being taken increased. If there is a 50% chance of the government's taking the property,
then an insurance company would charge at least $2,500 to insure against the loss of an
improvement worth $5,000. See id. (explaining that individuals with higher risks pay higher
insurance premiums). As a result, the owner's total cost of making the improvement would rise to
$6,500 ($4,000 in construction expenses plus $2,500 in insurance expenses), and the owner's
personal net expected payoff from building the improvement would consequently become negative
(-$1,500), matching the negative net social payoff of making the improvement. An economically
rational owner therefore would refrain from making the improvement, and consequently would end
up making the socially efficient choice.
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2. Administrative Cost Savings.-The second canonical argument for
the anti-compensation thesis springs from the observation that funding
government compensation for taken property requires increasing tax revenue
(assuming that the government does not cut spending elsewhere)." Thus, if
government compensation for takings is a system of government-provided
insurance, those higher taxes are effectively "premiums" paid for this
insurance.32
As a result, the argument continues, replacing government
compensation with private insurance would not increase owners' net
expenses, since the money spent to purchase private insurance would be
offset by the money saved in correspondingly lower taxes. 3 Indeed, owners
would actually save money because private insurance is likely to have lower
administrative costs than government compensation schemes do.3 Thus,
private insurers could simultaneously offer the same amount of coverage as
the government does and do so at a lower price. Moreover, the reduction in
taxes would also benefit non-owners, who have no need for takings
insurance. Everyone, the argument concludes, would be economically better
off.35
B. Insurance and the Standard Justiflcations for Compensation
These arguments for the anti-compensation thesis run squarely contrary
to a standard set of justifications for requiring government-paid
compensation for taken property. Hence, the thesis's plausibility will depend
on its ability to answer those justifications. As will soon become evident, the
31. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 17, at 282 (noting that owners protected by government
compensation will, as a result, have to pay higher taxes that "[o]n average ... just balance the
possible expectation of compensation").
32. See, e.g., id. at 283 ("Functionally .. . the taxes are equivalent to insurance premiums for
risk-averse taxpayers.").
33. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 128 ('[TIhrough payment of higher taxes to finance
compensation for takings, individuals must implicitly pay exactly the premium they would be
charged for private insurance coverage against takings .").
34. See, e.g., id. at 129 (observing that government-based compensation systems might incur
higher administrative costs than private-insurance systems in determining amounts of takings
compensation); Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should "Just Compensation"
Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 507 (2003)
(reasoning that "the overt motives of profit-maximization and the pressures of market competition"
minimize administrative costs for private insurance firms). Kaplow endorsed the idea that private
insurance might have lower administrative costs, but he acknowledged that the infrequency of the
government's taking property complicates the picture. Kaplow, supra note 14, at 547.
35. In economic language, the argument is that replacing government compensation with
private insurance would be Pareto superior. For a discussion of Pareto superiority and its
significance, see Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1515-20 (2003)
(reviewing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)).
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standard justifications score no clear victory over the private-insurance
alternative.
Categorizations of these justifications commonly distinguish between
those that focus on incentives for socially efficient behavior and those that
focus on "fairness." 6 For convenience, each set of justifications can be
discussed separately.
1. Efficiency.-One common rationale for the "just compensation"
requirement involves a trio of closely related arguments focused on socially
efficient decision-making. A brief survey of these arguments can make their
difficulties evident.
The first of the three arguments asserts that relieving governments of an
obligation to compensate for losses inflicted by their takings would subject
governments to a "fiscal illusion" about the size of their projects' social
costs." In economics terminology, removing the compensation obligation
would allow governments to avoid internalizing all of the costs of their
takings decisions." The ultimate result would be governments' taking private
property more often than is socially optimal.
The "fiscal illusion" justification is now well-established, and it has an
equally well-established counter-argument: government officials' primary
motivations are political rather than fiscal, and therefore reducing the fiscal
costs of taldngs is unlikely to have much influence on officials' decisions
about what projects to pursue." This response is itself somewhat
controversial. For example, it may be that local governments are more
36. The specific terms used and the exact groupings can vary. In particular, some discussions
treat "public choice" arguments as distinct from "efficiency" arguments. Nevertheless, the basic
catalog of standard arguments is widely established. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 877-85 (2007) (articulating
fairness-based, efficiency-based, and political-based justifications); Michael H. Schill,
Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question ofFederalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
829, 841-65 (1989) (addressing fairness and efficiency arguments for compensation); Christopher
Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICL L. REv. 345,
360-71 (2014) (addressing utilitarian-based and fairness-based takings justifications).
37. See, e.g., DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 41-46 (discussing the fiscal illusion argument
and concluding that "[i]f we do not require the government to pay compensation for takings ...
government officials may suffer from the 'fiscal illusion' that the resources they take have no
opportunity cost").
38. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 181 (suggesting that "the compensability of takings"
acts as a check upon overregulation by forcing the government to "internalize" the costs of its
takings).
39. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 130 ('[T]he individuals who make decisions whether
or not to take property may themselves not be much affected by the state's compensatory
disbursements."); Kaplow, supra note 14, at 569 (noting that "requiring compensation would not
necessarily counteract fiscal illusion" because of "political complications ... and the frequent
division of responsibility between those who decide issues of taxation and those who make other
decisions, such as choices of government projects").
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sensitive to fiscal incentives than state and federal governments are, and thus
are relatively more susceptible to "fiscal illusion," at least with respect to
projects that are not receiving state or federal funding.4 At the same time,
there is empirical evidence that governments do respond more to political
incentives than they do to fiscal concerns.4 1
Nevertheless, even if the fiscal-illusion concern has some prima facie
plausibility in some circumstances, the presence of a private-insurance
alternative to government compensation would reduce or eliminate much of
that concern's force. Whether or not governments are responsive to fiscal
concerns, no one disputes that they respond to political pressure, and private
companies that provide takings insurance would have a natural incentive to
exert political power against projects that required a taking. There is no
obvious reason to think that the political effect of this lobbying would be less
effective in forcing governments to recognize the costs of their takings than
the fiscal effect of requiring compensation would be.
A second efficiency-based justification for requiring government
compensation focuses on the risk of "rent-seeking" by opportunistic,
politically influential private actors hoping to induce the government to take
property for public projects that will benefit them personally even when
society as a whole would be better off if the project did not occur.42 This
second justification posits that a government's susceptibility to that sort of
influence depends, at least in part, on what the government would have to
pay to undertake those socially inefficient projects. Increasing those costs by
requiring the government to pay compensation for taken property might then
limit that susceptibility, thereby creating an obstacle to opportunism. 43
Once again, however, this justification loses force if government
compensation is replaced by private insurance. As noted a moment ago, the
40. See generally Christopher Serkin, Big Diferences for Small Governments: Local
Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624 (2006) (arguing that local
governments are sensitive to fiscal incentives in takings decisions, even if those incentives have less
effect at the state and federal levels).
41. See Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind? An
Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent-Domain
Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 437,463 (2016) (offering empirical support for the idea that political,
rather than fiscal, concerns motivate government officials). Lawrence Rosenthal has offered an
argument that bridges the gap between these two competing accounts. Rosenthal argues that because
fiscal constraints limit government officials' ability to direct resources in politically advantageous
ways, government officials' sensitivity to political incentives does not imply an insensitivity to
fiscal incentives, but rather the opposite. Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory ofGovernmental Damages
Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 832-37 (2007).
42. See Schill, supra note 36, at 861 (noting that just compensation reduces the incentive for
politically powerful groups to use uncompensated takings as a means to effect self-interested ends).
43. See id. ("Requiring the federal government to compensate property owners when it takes
their property reduces the incentives for this type of 'rent-seeking,' by spreading the costs of such
behavior to all citizens, including those in power." (footnote omitted)).
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companies providing that insurance would have a natural incentive to oppose
such takings (since they would have a natural incentive to oppose all takings),
and there is no reason to think that their political influence would be any less
effective than fiscal constraints are at thwarting such rent-seeking.
The third justification is a mirror image of the second, focusing on
impediments to efficient takings rather than on the risk of inefficient takings:
requiring the government to pay compensation serves to "buy off" politically
influential property owners who otherwise would have a natural incentive to
use their influence to stop socially beneficial takings of their own property."
This justification is, in effect, an observation that compensation might create
a socially beneficial form of "moral hazard" in the takings context,
decreasing owners' incentives to "take precautions" by lobbying to avoid the
government's taking property.45
Unlike the other two efficiency-based justifications, this third
justification's force is not undermined by the availability of private
insurance. Even if there is no need to "buy off" individual owners, since they
are insured against takings losses, there could still be a need to "buy off' the
companies that provide this insurance and thus have a strong incentive to
oppose governments' exercising their power of eminent domain.
However, the justification itself seems, at best, markedly incomplete.
First, it rests on an assumption that no better way to address harmful political
pressure exists than to, in effect, bribe it away. Moreover, since the
government does not generally attempt to purchase the acquiescence of
policies' opponents by paying them money, this justification creates a puzzle:
Why should eminent domain be a pronounced exception to the government's
typical practices when undertaking policies that do not enjoy universal
approval?" There is no obvious way for this justification to answer that
question.
2. "Fairness. "-Even if one sets aside the difficulties just noted,
efficiency-based justifications for requiring government compensation all
face a fundamental problem. What the Constitution requires, and courts have
repeatedly demanded, is not payment of "efficient" compensation but rather
payment of "just" compensation." In the oft-quoted words of Justice Black
44. See DANA & MERRHLL, supra note 6, at 46-47 (explaining the "buyoff' theory and noting
that "compensation [may] fimction[ as an important element in overcoming the opposition of
intense minorities to projects that are in the interest of the diffuse majority"); Farber, supra note 17,
at 290 ("The effect of the compensation requirement is to buy off the landowners and shift the cost
of the [government] project to other groups.").
45. For a general description of moral hazard, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 238.
46. Subpart H(D) infra will return to this general question, showing how the account offered in
this Article can answer it.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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in Armstrong v. United States," the Fifth Amendment's "just compensation"
requirement "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole." 9 Hence, no account of eminent domain's
normative foundations will be adequate unless it includes a plausible account
of how, and under what circumstances, takings are just and not merely
efficient.' Even if a concern for efficiency is a part of justice, it is not the
whole ofjustice. 1
The second set of standard justifications for requiring government
compensation springs from this concern about what justice requires.
However, as will soon be clear, these "fairness"-based justifications are also
vulnerable to the anti-compensation thesis's challenge. When faced with the
possibility of private insurance as an alternative to government
compensation, the standard justifications struggle to explain why "just
compensation" is not zero compensation.
One of the most influential "fairness"-based justifications rests on Frank
Michelman's famous assertion that utilitarian analyses of takings should
include assessments of "demoralization costs"-i.e., the value of unhappy
feelings that property owners would experience if their property were taken
48. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
49. Id. at 49. For a history of "the Armstrong principle" and its widespread influence, see
William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation
Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1151, 1153-54 & n.17-22 (1997).
50. Thomas Miceli notes that when the Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro article arguing for the
anti-compensation thesis was published, it "caused something of a stir, principally because it
seemed grossly unfair and also flew in the face of the constitutional requirement of just
compensation." MICEL, supra note 22, at 86.
51. Even many law-and-economics scholars acknowledge the relevance of at least some
concerns other than efficiency, commonly including the distribution of wealth in society. See, e.g.,
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674-75 (1994) (acknowledging concerns about
wealth distribution but arguing that they are best addressed not by changing the allocation of legal
rights and duties in specific corners of the law, but instead by increasing taxes on the wealthy and
government spending on the poor). For a recent textbook statement of a similar view, see COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 22, at 8. See also A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
EcONOMICS 153-62 (4th ed. 2011) (asserting that while "the efficiency analysis should be of
principal importance," other factors like the redistribution of wealth are relevant). For criticisms of
these economic approaches to distributive concerns, see, for example, Hanoch Dagan, Takings and
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 761, 789 (1999) (positing that distributive considerations
should play a prominent role in determining the amount of compensation paid for each taking). See
also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 4 (describing economic analyses of law as including
attention to "how laws affect the distribution of income across classes and groups"); Blume &
Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 606-07 (suggesting that only the poor--as the "most risk averse"-
should receive takings compensation because the rich can afford to purchase private insurance); Lee
Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2016) (arguing, inter alia, that adjusting legal rules is "not axiomatically
inferior to tax-and-transfer as a means of achieving or maintaining desired distributive results").
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without compensation and that other owners would experience from
worrying about whether their property too would suffer such a fate."
Michelman argued that when demoralization costs from denying
compensation are higher than the "settlement costs" of administering the
compensation-payment system, then society would benefit from requiring the
government to compensate. On this account, then, there is no inherent
problem with uncompensated takings, only a problem that may arise if those
takings happen to affect the feelings (and thus the "utility") experienced by
various people in certain ways.54
The availability of private insurance might go far to alleviate this
unhappiness, since insurance payments would diminish owners' monetary
losses. Because reducing owners' net losses would leave owners with less
52. Frank I. Michehnan, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). Michelman thought that the
utilitarian theory implied a further assumption that the intensity of those negative feelings was
increased by recognition that takings losses are deliberately inflicted by the government. Id. at 1216.
Dana and Merrill have criticized that assumption on the grounds that takings losses also are for the
public good and therefore may be less demoralizing than losses that seem to serve no purpose. DANA
& MERRILL, supra note 6, at 39. But see James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as
a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1307 (1985) (arguing that because "[e]minent
domain is one of the few situations in which citizens see the direct consequences of governmental
actions that negatively affect them," demoralization costs will increase if the project for which the
taken property is used "is not to the owner's liking").
53. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1215.
54. See id. at 1213 ("[W]e must remember that the utilitarian's solicitude for security is
instrumental and subordinate to his goal of maximizing the output of satisfactions. Security of
expectation is cherished, not for its own sake, but only as a shield for morale."). Nestor Davidson
has argued that arguments based on "demoralization costs" caused by the risk of legal change should
also recognize that the possibility of legal change might also have some positive psychological
effects on property owners. Thus, the net psychological effect of the possibility of legal change may
be less than often assumed. See Nestor M. Davidson, Property's Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437,
477 (2011) ("Legal transitions can support [positive psychological effects] as easily as they can
signal instability.").
55. Not everyone would agree. William Fischel and Perry Shapiro argue that insurance would
have no effect on demoralization costs because "[a]n insurance payment simply spreads this loss
over time. . . ." William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STuD. 269,287
(1988). Hence, even with insurance, property owners would still experience the same losses and
thus would suffer the same demoralization. Id. at 286-87. This argument seems incomplete.
Insurance does not spread losses merely over time but also over a broad group of people, most of
whom will not themselves directly experience a loss. (For example, most houses never catch fire,
even though homeowners routinely carry fire insurance.) Thus, the payment received from
insurance in the event of a loss is ordinarily greater than the premiums that the recipient had paid to
purchase insurance. That difference, in fact, is a principal motivation for buying insurance in the
first place, and it is also the source of insurance's "moral hazard" problem. (There would be no
moral hazard if insurance had no effect on the experienced costs of damaging events.) Thus, even
if insurance did not eliminate the burdens of takings losses, it ordinarily would sharply reduce them,
and thus would predictably reduce demoralization costs suffered by those whose property was taken.
Of course, everyone who pays premiums for that insurance might feel some "demoralization" from
the need to make those payments, and those feelings would need to be included in any calculation
950
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cause for regret, demoralization costs would accordingly shrink, and the case
for requiring government compensation would also diminish.'
Moreover, the demoralization-costs argument faces a fundamental
objection arising out of its dependence on utilitarianism. 57 On such accounts
there is nothing inherently wrong with the government's forcibly taking
property and not paying for it. Uncompensated takings are condemned only
if they produce negative psychological reactions. There may, however, be
more than one way to avoid those reactions. Thus, this theory would offer no
objection to the government's taking property without paying for it, so long
as those takings are accompanied by a suitably effective plan to avoid
upsetting the populace, perhaps by deploying pervasive propaganda or
imposing strict secrecy measures to ensure that the government's actions did
not become widely known. Michelman himself suggested that, at least in
some cases, the government "could reasonably count on holding down the
demoralization costs of a failure to compensate either by preventing the
matter from becoming widely known or by not revealing the general
implications of this particular decision," even when "[flairness rather clearly
requires compensation ... ."5 The difficulty now is evident: suggesting that
justice is indifferent between compensating people and deceiving them,
except insofar as one approach or the other is more effective at producing
positive feelings, calls into question whether this account really rests on
considerations of justice at all.
of insurance's net effect on demoralization. Whether the total amount of demoralization caused by
everyone's paying for insurance would exceed the total demoralization caused by uninsured losses
is an empirical question that a priori theorizing cannot definitively resolve. However, since most
people seem to be risk averse, it seems likely that insurance would tend to reduce overall
demoralization costs. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 318 (2011)
("People are willing to pay much more for insurance than expected value-which is how insurance
companies cover their costs and make their profits. Here again, people buy more than protection
against an unlikely disaster; they eliminate a worry and purchase peace of mind."). Moreover, there
is empirical evidence that risk aversion varies across demographic groups, such as age and gender.
See J. Frangois Outreville, Risk Aversion, Risk Behavior, and Demand for Insurance: A Survey, 37
J. INS. ISSUES 158, 166-70 (2014) (supporting the conclusion that "[ciharacteristics such as gender,
age, race, and religion clearly affect one's level of risk aversion"). Hence, the amount of
demoralization from a lack of insurance may also vary across those groups, raising the possibility
that even if insurance were to have no effect on the total amount of demoralization in society, it still
might affect the distribution of that demoralization and thus be desirable on distributional grounds.
56. Cf DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 38-39 (arguing that Michelman's account needs to
explain why takings should receive government compensation when protection against many
disappointing events is left to private insurance).
57. The literature on utilitarianism is now vast. For a classic discussion, see generally J.J.C.
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
58. Michelman, supra note 52, at 1224.
59. Although Michelman's discussion of the utilitarian argument for compensation is the best-
known part of his 1967 paper, the second half of that paper sought to avoid the weaknesses of the
utilitarian account by offering an alternative account based on several philosophical papers by John
Rawls. Id., at 1219-45. Space does not permit an analysis of this alternative account, other than to
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A second "fairness"-based account-one more closely related to the
ordinary idea ofjustice--rests on a particular concern about equal treatment,
frequently associated with the Arnstrong Court's assertion that the purpose
of requiring governments to compensate for taken property is to avoid
"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." The equal-treatment
account interprets this principle as concerned about the inequity of burdening
one person with a taking when other people, perhaps very similarly situated,
are not burdened."'
Although concerns about equal treatment may have considerable
intuitive appeal, this particular argument provides little reason to favor
government compensation for takings over a system of private insurance.
Under a system of private insurance, all property owners are burdened by
having to purchase insurance, and each owner of taken property receives
"compensation" payments from the relevant insurer. Thus, each property
owner equally bears the cost of takings. Although the burden of purchasing
insurance falls only on those who own property, unequal treatment of that
sort is common and not generally considered unjust. Property owners
routinely have burdens that are considered legitimate despite not being shared
by everyone-for example, an obligation to pay annual taxes on the value of
their property.6 2 Thus, there is no obvious reason to conclude that the
note that it focuses on the distribution of wealth and thus fimdamentally differs from the relational-
justice account that will be developed in Part IL
60. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
61. Some courts, even before Armstrong, had expressed a similar idea. See, e.g., Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893):
And in this there is a natural equity which ... prevents the public from loading upon
one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that
when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is
exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned
to him.
The idea also has historical antecedents in scholarly commentary. In a prize-winning student essay,
James Bradley Thayer argued:
[Piroperty which is taken [by eminent domain], is something .. . above or aside from
the owner's regular share in the common expenses; ... but no man can be supposed to
have agreed to bear more than his share of the common burdens; there is no principle
upon which such an unequal distribution could be based; and therefore, if a man's
property be taken by the State, he is entitled to have this, his excessive contribution,
made up to him by compensation.
J.B. Thayer, Essay, The Right ofEminent Domain, 19 MONTHLY L. REP. 241, 250 (1856) (footnotes
omitted).
62. For an overview of the property tax system, see generally Ronald C. Fisher, What Policy
Makers Should Know About Property Taxes, LAND LINES, Jan. 2009, at 8. Larissa Katz has argued
that, in fact, property is "an office through which the state assigns burdens" to property owners.
Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights Enhance
State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2034 (2012). If Katz's argument is correct, it would follow
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particular sort of unequal treatment that remained after replacing government
compensation with private insurance would be unjustified.
Moreover, even among property owners the burdens imposed by the law
are frequently unequal and uncompensated. As Thomas Merrill has noted,
the equal-treatment argument "fails to explain why some forms of 'unequal'
treatment are compensated while others are not.... Clearly, some limiting
principle other than equal treatment is needed to explain why compensation
should be forthcoming in some cases but not in others."" This objection is,
in effect, a specific application of a general argument that any adequate
justification for requiring compensation for takings will need to explain why
takings should receive compensation when many other burdensome "legal
transitions" do not.65
Hence, neither established efficiency-based justifications nor
established "fairness"-based justifications offer a convincing reason to reject
the anti-compensation thesis and require government compensation for
taldngs." If these justifications were the only relevant considerations, then
leaving owners to rely on private insurance to protect against takings losses
that this sort of unequal treatment is an inherent feature of property ownership and thus presumably
would not automatically justify demands for compensation.
63. A related open question is whether the proper perspective from which to assess the equality
of treatment is ax ante or ax post. Although ax post the treatment of the owner of taken property
differs from the treatment of owners whose property was not taken, ax ante they were all subject to
the same risk that their property might be taken, and thus they were treated equally at that point.
The losses that followed, then, were merely the actualization of those equally distributed risks. The
equal-treatment principle by itself does not settle which of these two perspectives is the morally
appropriate one for purposes of evaluating the equality of treatment.
64. Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
1561, 1579-80 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
65. Subpart 11(D) infra will discuss that argument in more detail.
66. Some commentators identify a third category of justification for requiring the government
to pay compensation, one framed in terms of concerns about flaws in the process by which
governments decide whether to take property. For example, Saul Levmore has offered a prominent
account of takings compensation based on concerns about "singling out" individual property
owners. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV 1333, 1344-48 (1991)
(restating the account and emphasizing the phrase "singling out"). Levmore argues that takings
compensation is required to protect small, politically uninfluential groups, such as individual
property owners, from potential exploitation by a politically powerful majority. Saul Levmore, Just
Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 291-93, 305-11 (1990). Although at first
glance Levmore's account focuses on concerns about failures of the political process, the account
is not fundamentally different from the two types of accounts already discussed, because the reasons
that Levmore offers for concern about these failures ultimately rest on the risk of inefficient takings
or of unequal treatment. Id. at 308-11. Thus, Levmore's account amounts to a variant of those two
theories, and rejoinders that the anti-compensation argument could offer to each of them would
apply to Levmore's account as well. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 605 ("Concerns about abuse of
power are potentially far more important in the context of takings than in most other transition
contexts precisely because takings often single out individuals or groups. Again, the increased
likelihood of private insurance in the absence of a compensation requirement ... would do much to
alleviate this problem."); Levinson, supra note 4, at 394-95 (discussing and criticizing the "singling
out" account).
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could seem a quite plausible alternative to government compensation. As the
next Part will show, however, the considerations behind these standard
justifications are incomplete. They fail to account for an additional important
but often overlooked consideration-the requirements of what this Article
terms "relational justice."
II. Takings and Relational Justice
The discussion to this point has argued that the anti-compensation
thesis's challenge to standard justifications for the "just compensation"
requirement cannot easily be dismissed. However, as this Part will explain,
neither the considerations that produce those standard justifications nor the
considerations that motivate the anti-compensation thesis exhaust the
concerns ofjustice. In particular, established arguments have failed to notice
that justice has an important "relational" dimension in the eminent domain
context. Recognizing that dimension both reveals the fundamental error in
the economic approach of considering takings compensation to be merely a
form of government-provided insurance and explains why private insurance
is an inadequate substitute for government compensation.
A. Justice's Intrinsic and Relational Aspects
Many of the arguments discussed so far-both for and against the "just
compensation" requirement-have shared two basic limitations, both of
which are common in contemporary analyses of takings law. First, they are
wholly instrumental. That is, they justify requiring compensation, or not
requiring compensation, by appealing to some other presumed good that
compensation policy is asserted to promote-such as socially efficient
decision-making or avoiding feelings of demoralization. This fact is not
surprising in light of the widespread influence of economic analyses of law,
since economic reasoning is paradigmatically instrumental.67 Justice,
67. See, for example, Lionel Robbins's classic definition: "Economics is the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative
uses." LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
15 (1932); see also MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 63 (Guenter Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978) ("'Rational economic action' requires instrumental rationality... ."). Strictly speaking,
Robbins's definition is of economics as understood in neoclassical theory. See Daniel M. Hausman,
Introduction (arguing that Robbins is "attempting to define economics as neoclassical theory"), in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 38 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 2d ed. 1994).
However, since the economics that inspires law-and-economics scholarship and the anti-
compensation arguments at issue here is predominantly neoclassical, that limitation is immaterial
for present purposes. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998) ("Traditional law and
economics is largely based on the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics."); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 293, 293 (1992)
(noting that law-and-economics scholarship is built upon a foundation in which "[e]conomists
model and attempt to predict individual behavior on the assumption that people act rationally with
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however, is not a purely instrumental good. Rather, it is important, at least in
part, for its own sake." Thus, one would expect that the most compelling
account of the "just compensation" requirement would offer, at least in part,
an identification of compensation's intrinsic importance, not merely its
instrumental usefulness.
Second, both the standard justifications for requiring compensation and
the arguments for replacing public compensation with private insurance have
largely been indifferent to the relationships that exist among the various
people and institutions who are involved when the state exercises its power
of eminent domain. The importance of relationships among specific parties
is again easy to overlook from a purely economic perspective because the
quintessentially economic concerns of efficiency-i.e., the total amount of
wealth in society-and "faimess"-understood as the distribution of wealth
among broad social classes-both focus on aggregates of people and
institutions." The aggregate point of view necessarily abstracts away from
relationships among individuals, except to the extent that those relationships,
taken together, instrumentally affect the total amount of wealth or its general
distribution. Thus, to the extent that such relationships have normative
importance-and this Part will argue that they do-even the most plausible
accounts discussed so far are necessarily incomplete.
The one exception to this characterization is the "equal treatment"
account, which differs from the other accounts in two significant ways. First,
at least in some forms, it does regard equal treatment as intrinsically
important, not merely as instrumentally desirable for attaining some other
end. Second, it does recognize the significance of one specific type of
relationship among individuals: the quantitative relationship of being more
burdened by a taking than other people are.70
However, the relationship upon which the equal-treatment account
focuses is quite minimal. It is not based on any interaction or connection
between the related parties, but only on a comparison between them, based
the goal of maximizing their expected utility"); Ejan Mackasy, History of Law and Economics
(describing the neoclassical influences on the seminal first decades of law-and-economics
scholarship but also noting the emergence of competing approaches in later years), in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME I: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 65, 65-67 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
68. For a brief discussion of the early roots, stretching back to Plato's Republic, of the idea that
justice is valuable for its own sake, see 1 TERENCE IRWIN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS: A
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY 100-01 (2007).
69. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 4 (describing economic analyses of law as
being concerned with efficiency-"a comprehensive measure of public benefits"--and "how laws
affect the distribution of income across classes and groups"). Cooter and Ulen note that some
scholars argue that efficiency alone is the proper focus of economic analyses of law, thus setting
distributional concerns entirely aside. Id.
70. See supra section I(B)(2).
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on whether a given owner's burden is greater than, less than, or equal to other
people's burdens. This sort of merely comparative relationship exists among
every person, and even between persons and inanimate things. It is the same
type of relationship that everyone has to the Queen of England or to Mount
Everest-i.e., being younger (or older) than her or smaller than it.
These highly attenuated sorts of relationships may be of interest to
metaphysicians, but they are quite remote from the interpersonal
relationships that play a central role in human life. Some of those
interpersonal relationships are largely involuntary, such as being in a
particular family or political community, while others are chosen, such as
being a creditor or a member of a club. Both types of relationship, however,
are normatively fertile in that they can give rise to obligations and
entitlements, whether it is a moral duty to care for an aging parent or a moral
and legal duty to repay a loan from a friend. As a result, justice inevitably
will have something to say about them.
A brief terminological note may be useful. As will soon be evident, the
issues of justice that arise out of these relationships-what, for convenience,
one might call "relational justice" issues-are distinct from oft-discussed
concerns about the overall distribution of wealth in society-i.e., from the
"distributive justice" that today is frequently equated with "fairness."'
Although there is no canonical taxonomy of types of justice, the closest
traditional category into which relational justice would fit is perhaps
"commutative justice." However, even classic sources disagree about the
sorts of considerations that fall within that category. For example, in
commenting on Aristotle's analysis of justice, Aquinas applied the term
"commutative justice" both to justice that involved voluntary transactions
and to justice that involved rectifying crimes and other wrongs.73 By contrast,
71. The same can be said of the common claim that property as an institution is inherently
"relational," in the sense of the textbook principle that "[flor lawyers, if not lay people, property is
an abstraction. It refers not to things, material or otherwise, but to rights or relationships among
people with respect to things." DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 83. The type of relationship
that this sort of assertion typically has in mind is purely formal, inspired by Hohfeld's classic
discussion of the relationship between various correlated legal statuses, as when one person's right
against another (e.g., a right to exclude) corresponds to that second person's duty toward the first
(e.g., a duty not to trespass). See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 17 (1990)
("If the law views property as relations among persons with respect to things, which relations are
involved? A start on an answer lies in Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions."). For Hohfeld's
analysis, see generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
72. For an example of this common use of the term "distributive justice," see MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING To Do? 192 (2009) ("When we discuss distributive
justice these days, we are concerned mainly with the distribution of income, wealth, and
opportunities.").
73. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 400-03 (C.I. Litzinger
trans., 1964) (commenting on Book V, Chapter 4 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics). Adam Smith
used a similar definition. ADAM SMrrH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 318 (Knud
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Hobbes asserted that "[t]o speak properly, commutative justice, is the justice
of a contractor. . . ."7 4
Moreover, neither definition quite captures the specific type of situation
that arises in the context of eminent domain. Justice in consensual
transactions is an imperfect fit because takings are inherently non-
consensual. Rectification of wrongs (commonly associated with "corrective
justice") is not quite apt either because the state does not commit a wrong
when it exercises its power of eminent domain. Ultimately, however,
taxonomies are useful only to the extent that they clarify the nature of the
things that they categorize. Because pigeonholing the sorts of considerations
raised by takings compensation into one philosophical category or another is
unlikely to offer any additional clarity, this taxonomical question can safely
be put aside, and this Article will simply use the term "relational justice" to
refer to the general category of justice at issue here. 6
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759) ("The first sense of the word ['justice']
coincides with what Aristotle and the Schoolmen call commutative justice ... which consists in
abstaining from what is another's, and in doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced
to do.").
74. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1651).
75. For discussion of the non-wrongfulness of takings, see infra section II(C)(2). For a
representative characterization of corrective justice as involving rectifying wrongs, see JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 320 (1998) ("[A] natural understanding of the principle of
corrective justice is the following: Corrective justice imposes the duty to repair the wrongs one
does."). Coleman's own view is slightly different "The view I want to defend is that the duty of
wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses for which they are responsible." Id.
at 324. Ernest Weinrib's theory of "corrective justice" encompasses not only rectification of
wrongfully inflicted losses but also restitution for certain lawful acts that enrich one party but harm
another. Weinrib's example is restitution for damage caused by one party's entry onto another's
property to seek shelter from an imminent grave peril, entry that was made without the owner's
consent but nevertheless is permitted by law. (Weinrib offers the famous case of Vincent v. Lake
Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456 (1910), as a specific example.) ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 196-200 (1995). Some historical views of the nature of takings compensation thus
might fit fairly easily within Weinrib's category of "corrective justice." On those views, whether
the state is permitted to take private property for public use and whether the state is obligated to
compensate for taken property are two separate questions, with answers that derive from two
separate sets of reasons. As a result, although the state would be wrong not to compensate for taken
property, failure to compensate would not make the taking itself wrongful. See, e.g., PHILP
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 204, at 623-24 (1917) (providing historical support
for the idea that "the obligation to make compensation is a condition imposed upon the exercise of
the power in all well[-]ordered communities" rather than "an essential part of the power of eminent
domain"). Similarly, Weinrib's discussion treats the question of the permissibility of unconsented
entry as distinct from the question of whether compensation is owed for losses caused by the entry.
See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra, at 198 (arguing that in cases such as Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co. "[t]he fact that the use of the dock was justified does not mean that the defendant should retain
the benefit of that use by avoiding its costs"). However, a significantly different competing view-
a view for which this Article is arguing-is that payment of compensation is (at least normally) a
necessary condition for an exercise of eminent domain to be legitimate at all. See infra note 97 and
accompanying text. Such a view seems to fall outside Weinrib's category of "corrective justice."
76. Although identifying this category's outer contours lies beyond the scope of this Article, it
seems likely that "relational justice" is a general category that includes both "corrective justice" and
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For present purposes, two specific kinds of relationship will turn out to
be essential for understanding takings law's "just compensation"
requirement-both why it exists and why private insurance would not be an
adequate substitute. One of these relationships is that which exists between
property owners and the community to which each belongs. The second is
the relationship that arises when one person benefits by imposing a burden
on another person.
As the discussion in this Part will explain, one of the immediate benefits
of considering these relationships is that doing so brings to light the error in
assuming that takings compensation is merely a form of government-
provided insurance. Recognizing that error in turn will clear the way to see
how compensation's role in eminent domain is not principally to mitigate
losses that may happen to befall a property owner, but instead to make the
exercise of eminent domain be legitimate. It will then follow that
compensation must come from the community that benefited by imposing the
burden created by the taking, not from a third party whom the burdened
owner had paid to protect it from that burden. That is, the government must
compensate for the property that it takes, and the reason it must do so is to
make that taking be relationally just.
B. Reconsidering the Insurance Analogy
As noted earlier, the anti-compensation thesis rests on a fundamental
assumption that takings compensation is a form of government-provided
insurance against takings losses.78 That assumption then raised the question
of whether private insurance might serve this function just as well as
government insurance does, or perhaps even better.
At first glance, the assumption that takings compensation is merely a
form of insurance might seem plausible. From one perspective, there may
seem to be no difference between, for example, an increase in wildfire risk's
causing an owner to lose her house when it is consumed in a wildfire and the
increase in wildfire risk's causing the owner to lose her house when the
government takes it to build an additional fire station to help control
wildfires. In both cases the owner loses the property, and in both cases the
purely contractual "commutative justice" (of the sort that Hobbes had in mind), as well as at least
one other subcategory of justice-namely the subcategory that includes the justice required by the
relationships that exist in the takings context. Since coining yet another term for this particular
subcategory would not enhance the clarity of this Article's discussion, and the multiplication of
jargon can confuse more than it enlightens, this Article will simply use the term "relational justice,"
with a tacit qualification that the type of relational justice relevant in the takings context is only one
of several possible types of relational justice.
77. Cf Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1047-48 (2009) (discussing implications of the fact that
"property law concerns .. . relations among persons").
78. See supra subpart I(A).
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ultimate cause is the increase in wildfire risk. Since the former loss is the sort
of loss for which private insurance is routinely relied upon, why shouldn't
the latter be as well?
However, two fundamental structural differences between insurance
and takings compensation become evident once one considers the
relationships between the people paying the compensation and the owners
who receive it." Treating takings compensation as akin to insurance rests on
a mistake about those relationships.
The first important structural difference arises from the fact that
government-paid compensation is funded by tax revenue. Since property
taxes are only one type of tax, the people who pay "premiums" for this
"insurance" and those who are "covered" by it are not the same."o The set of
"premium" payers is the set of all taxpayers-including those who pay
income tax or sales tax-but the people "covered" are only those taxpayers
who are also property owners.81 This mismatch implies that what non-owner
taxpayers are paying for is not "insurance." Taxpayers who do not own real
property, and therefore are at zero risk of a taking, obviously are not buying
insurance against a loss to which they are inherently immune.8 2
79. Some prominent commentators have expressed moral qualms about pervasive substitution
of commercial relationships for other forms of relationship. These critics might consider the
replacement of public compensation with private insurance purchased in the open market to be
another instance of the "commodification" that they warn against. However, the arguments
advanced in the present Article rest on other grounds and do not presuppose any general aversion
to (or endorsement of) the spread of market-based relationships. For examples of these concerns,
see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHIcs AND ECONOMICS 166 (1993) ("In treating human
relations as indifferently substitutable means for acquiring goods, welfare economics blinds itself
to the ways markets undermine certain expressive relations with others."); MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES xii (1996) (asserting that "there can be coexistent commodified and
noncommodified understandings of various aspects of social life" but also that it is necessary to ask
"whether that coexistence is unstable, threatening to decay into a monolithic structure of
commodification"); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITs
OF MARKETS 51 (2012) (prefacing a critical discussion of using monetary incentives as a policy
tool with the observation that, "[t]o a remarkable degree, the last few decades have witnessed the
remaking of social relations in the image of market relations").
80. See Fisher, supra note 62, at 9 (reporting the revenue that different levels of government
receive from property taxes, relative to other revenue sources).
81. Cf Schill, supra note 36, at 854 n.98 ("A major difference between compensation and
insurance is that for compensation, there is no necessary correlation between the amount of taxes
paid by a citizen and the expected loss to that citizen from condemnation. With regard to insurance,
however, the insured's premium includes a payment which is approximately equal to the expected
loss from the event insured against").
82. For the same reason, salaries paid to soldiers conscripted into the military in times of war
are not analogous to insurance claims payments made to those conscripted citizens to alleviate the
burdens of military service, payments that might have been replaced by requiring all military-aged
males to buy private insurance against conscription. (Since conscription is done by lottery, the
similarity between money paid to conscripts and private insurance might be even greater than in the
case of takings. Hence, the implausibility of thinking of military pay as insurance payments further
suggests that skepticism of that analogy in the takings context is appropriate.)
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A second important structural difference springs from the fact that the
community, acting through the government, does not merely compensate for
the taking but also benefits from the taking. In this crucial respect, the losses
imposed by takings are fundamentally different from losses that are typical
in ordinary property and casualty insurance. If a burst water pipe damages an
office, a wildfire consumes a house, or a collision damages an automobile,
those losses do not benefit anyone, except incidentally those who profit from
repairing such damage. Unlike in eminent domain cases, the damage suffered
in these cases is pure loss. Because no one benefits from these sorts of losses,
it is natural to conclude that the burden of such losses must be borne by
whoever was unfortunate enough to suffer them, and thus that the victim must
rely on private insurance for relief." No one else bears a relevant relationship
to the burden."
By contrast, an essential fact about takings losses is that the burden
placed on taken property's owners is related to producing a benefit to others,
and that relationship is not merely incidental. The burden is not merely a
byproduct of the government's producing the public benefit but rather a
means of the government's doing so.ss The benefit results from imposing the
83. One might, of course, have a view that the costs of all such losses should be spread across
everyone-"socialized"-and thus that the government should compensate each victim who
suffered a loss. Such a view would obviously provide an additional reason to require the government
to pay compensation for the property that it takes, but trivially so, since the government would be
paying compensation for all losses.
84. There is one notable exception to that general characterization of casualty insurance: When
the loss is the result of wrongdoing by someone other than the victim, this additional party--the
wrongdoer--does have a relevant relationship to the loss. The existence of a robust private insurance
market against such losses-for example, theft insurance-does not suggest that private-insurance
is an appropriate substitute for compensation by the wrongdoer who caused those losses. Victims
of theft, negligent harms, and the like need to insure against those losses because determining the
identities of the relevant wrongdoers may be difficult-for example, some thieves are never
caught-and even if their identities are discovered, suing them for compensation can be expensive
and may ultimately be fruitless if the defendants lack the resources to provide the required
compensation. See generally, e.g., S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 45 (1986) (offering an economic analysis of "judgment proof" defendants). Hence,
compensation through private insurance is merely a second-best solution, one that does not relieve
the wrongdoer of an obligation to pay compensation. These reasons for settling for a second-best
solution do not apply in eminent domain cases, since the taker's identity is obvious and
governments' power to tax ensures that governments rarely will lack sufficient funds to pay
compensation. Moreover, in these sorts of casualty-insurance cases, subrogation typically allows
the insurer who pays compensation to seek reimbursement from the perpetrator. See 25 C.JS.
Damages § 190 (2012) ("[T]he insurer is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured as
against the tortfeasor or . .. may recover back from the insured the amount of the recovery."). So
even if takings compensation were analogous to casualty insurance, and thus private insurance could
displace the government in its role as insurer against losses from takings, that fact would not itself
displace the government's role as perpetrator of the taking, and it therefore would leave the
government still liable to pay compensation (this time, however, to the insurance companies).
85. Cf United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946) (distinguishing between "a definite
exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land" and "a case of incidental
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burden, such as by using the taken property as the site for a park, a school, or
a fire station."
As a result, in takings cases, but not in the case of accidents or natural
disasters, a particular relationship exists between the cause of the loss and the
party that suffers the loss: the former has benefited by imposing a loss on the
latter." Recognizing this relationship suggests that what connects taxpayers
who are paying for takings compensation is not that they all are protected by
a policy of compensating for takings-as noted earlier, they are not-but
rather that they all belong to the community that benefits from the taking."
damages arising from a legalized nuisance'). This characterization of eminent domain's burdens
does require some qualification, since taking property typically imposes more than one type of
burden. Some of those burdens are merely incidental to the benefit received-for example, the
transaction costs of finding and acquiring suitable property to replace the property that was taken
and the psychological pain that owners may suffer from leaving their property. The value lost in
suffering those burdens is not transferred to the parties that benefit from the taking. Instead, it simply
is lost See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 964
(2004) ("Because [the subjective premium] is personal to the individual landowner, its confiscation
in the course of eminent domain necessarily means its outright destruction rather than its transfer to
someone else."). Nevertheless, the chief burden that a taking imposes is the loss of the property
itself, and that loss is essential in producing the gain that the public receives as a result of the public
project that made the taking necessary. (If the loss were not essential to produce the gain, then the
taking would not be necessary and therefore would not be permitted at all. See 6 NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.11[2][a][iii] (2018) ("Before exercising the power of eminent domain there
must be a determination that the taking is necessary to advance a legitimate public purpose.").)
86. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 297, 321-22 (1893) (addressing
condemnation of land for the creation of Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C.); Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1875) (addressing condemnation of land in Cincinnati so that a post
office and other public buildings could be built there).
87. Kaplow acknowledged that losses from takings differed from losses that the government
did not cause, but he did not recognize that the relevant difference lies not only in who caused the
loss but also in who benefits by imposing the loss. As a result, he saw no reason to have different
approaches to compensating for those losses:
With fire insurance or market risks, one expects to be self-reliant in securing
protection; when the risk is directly linked to the government, one is more inclined to
look to the government for protection. But this distinction does not indicate what
different values, if any, are implicated by the origin of unequal burdens, or that any
such difference in values would call for a governmental response that diverges from
what investors would find worthwhile when responding to market risks.
Kaplow, supra note 14, at 578. Recognizing the importance of the community's having benefited
by imposing the loss explains why the inclination to look to the community (acting through the
government) for compensation makes sense for certain types of policy change, independent of any
economic considerations of the sort that Kaplow's account focuses on.
88. Although each member of the community likely does not personally benefit from every
particular exercise of eminent domain-for example, an aged childless widow does not personally
benefit from the construction of a public school on the other side of town-that fact is immaterial.
What matters is that such people are still members of the community that does benefit from the
exercise. Doctrinally, this fact is reflected in an acknowledgment that a taking can validly be for
"public use" even if not every member of the public personally benefits from it See, e.g., Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896) ("It is not essential that the entire
community or even any considerable portion thereof should directly enjoy or participate in an
improvement in order to constitute a public use.").
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This recognition also casts a different light on the Armstrong principle.
When the Armstrong Court referred to "public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," it was silent about why
those burdens should be borne by the entire public." As noted earlier, a
common assumption is that the court thought that the public should bear those
burdens because otherwise, unequal treatment would result." However, an
equally possible interpretation is that the court meant that the public should
bear those burdens because the public imposed them for its own benefit." In
fact, in context, the latter interpretation is actually more plausible than the
former. In the same paragraph in which the Court stated the principle, it
emphasized that the government executed the taking "for its own advantage,"
but the Court made no mention of how the owner's burdens compared to
other people's. 2
The existence of this particular relationship between an owner burdened
by a taking and the public that benefits by imposing that burden suggests that
when the public, acting through the government, pays compensation for
takings, it is acting as a purchaser of a good rather than as an insurer against
a loss (that it itself caused). The next subpart will examine that suggestion,
and its implications, in more detail.
C. Relationships and Justification
1. Eminent Domain as a "Forced Sale. "-Because the losses suffered
when property is taken directly benefit the community that takes that
property, it is not surprising that courts and commentators have often found
it natural to refer to the government's condemnation of private property as a
"forced sale."' For example, Justice Cardozo declared that
89. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
90. See supra section I(B)(2).
91. Thomas Merrill's discussion in Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle reflects this
ambiguity. He says: "The justification for compensation that emerges most clearly from the opinions
of the Supreme Court is that of equal treatment. Simply put, it is said to be 'unfair' to make a few
pay for the good of the many." Merrill, supra note 64, at 1579. The latter sentence seems implicitly
to acknowledge the normative importance of the relationship between the people who are burdened
and the people who are benefited by means of imposing those burdens. However, Merrill's
subsequent elaboration of this point instead focuses exclusively on the relationship between people
whose property is taken and people whose property is not taken-i.e., on the relationship between
those who are burdened and those who are not burdened. Id. at 1579-80.
92. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.
93. See, e.g., Madden v. Comm'r, 514 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1975) (referring to exercise of
eminent domain as a "forced sale"); Law Offices of Vincent Vitale v. Tabbytite, 942 P.2d 1141,
1147 (Alaska 1997) (asserting that takings compensation "can readily be categorized as money
accruing from a sale of the land in question"); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Church, 136
P.2d 139, 145 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1943) ("The relations between a condemnee and a
condemnor have often been likened in decisions to those between a seller and a purchaser.");
Pearson v. Johnson, 54 Miss. 259, 263 (1876) ("The proceeding has the elements of an enforced
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"' [c]ondemnation' is an enforced sale, and the state stands toward the owner
as buyer toward seller. On that basis the rights and duties of each must be
determined."" A closely related strain of thought treats the state's obligation
to pay compensation for takings as equitable, involving an implied contract.95
Reinforcing the idea that takings fundamentally are compelled versions of
voluntary sales, many state statutes require that the government first attempt
to purchase property in a negotiated transaction before exercising its power
of eminent domain over that property."
Once one thinks of the two parties in an instance of eminent domain-
the state and the owner-as a buyer and a seller, then it becomes easy to
recognize why it is important that takings compensation be paid by the taker
rather than by private insurance purchased by the taken property's owner.
Consider the following simple hypothetical: someone goes to a grocery store
and walks out with a carton of milk without paying for it, but a bystander
takes pity on the shopkeeper and pays her a sum equivalent to the price of the
milk. In this case, the shopkeeper has suffered no loss, but the unpaid taking
of the milk nevertheless is wrongful. A person who takes milk from a store
avoids acting wrongly only if he pays for the milk that he takes.97 Payment
sale."); see also 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.142[6] (2016) (asserting that acceptance of
the theory that eminent domain is a compulsory sale "seems almost inevitable" in jurisdictions that
require payment of compensation in advance for taken property); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *139 ("The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual
for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a
reasonable price.. . ."). The element of compulsion, however, keeps eminent domain largely
outside the realm of contract law, except by implication if the state fails to pay compensation. See,
e.g., In re Parking Place in Hempstead, 140 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) ("It seems
clear that acquisition of real property by condemnation possesses no contractual attributes. Its very
nature is opposed to the idea of contractual relationship since it is a power to take property in spite
of the owner's objection so long as just compensation is made."). Doctrinally, the analogy to a sale
thus has its strongest legal force if compensation is not paid. See, e.g., CARMAN FITZ RANDOLPH,
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 209-10 (1894) ("The right to
compensation[,] whether it be deemed inherent or constitutional, is not usually considered as
founded on contract. . . . But where land is condemned and compensation withheld, the transaction
is generally treated as an ordinary purchase, and the owner holds a lien for the compensation.").
94. Jackson v. State, 106 N.E. 758, 758 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.).
95. See, e.g., Alabama v. United States, 282 U.S. 502, 503 (1931) ("There is a strong analogy
in the cases requiring the United States, under an implied contract, to pay for private property which
it takes for public use.").
96. See, e.g., 7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G2.05(3] (2018) (stating that "a good faith
attempt to negotiate a purchase" is one of the "more common" conditions precedent that must be
satisfied before a government is entitled to take property).
97. The payment of money is a necessary constituent of a legitimate act in such circumstances.
For a related discussion of this point, see Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV.
391, 402 (2015) (describing the role of "constitutive compensation" in legitimating actions). Jules
Coleman has offered a similar example to make a similar point. See COLEMAN, supra note 75, at
291-92 (distinguishing among three different roles that compensation may play and offering an
example of eating a salad at a Korean produce market, where "[m]y eating the salad they offer is
justified provided I pay them what they (fairly) charge me for it").
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of the stated price makes a customer's acquisition of the milk legitimate-
payment is what makes him a "customer" rather than a "thief"--but only if
the person who pays the price is the same as the person who took the milk.
Otherwise, the person who takes the milk has misappropriated it, and the
shopkeeper has merely been fortunate to benefit from the bystander's charity.
Changing the scenario slightly so that the money that the shopkeeper
receives is an insurance-claim payment from an anti-theft policy that she had
purchased does not affect the injustice of the customer's action. The payment
of money equal to the price of the milk ("compensation") absolves the
customer from misappropriation only if the customer himself makes the
payment. The relationship among the customer, the shopkeeper, and the
payment is inseparable from the moral status of the customer's acquisition of
the milk.
The implication for eminent domain is straightforward. To the extent
that acquisition of property through takings is analogous to acquisition of
property by sale, the acquisition will be legitimate only if the entity that
acquires the property also pays compensation to the owner from whom it was
acquired.98 Justice is not satisfied by leaving the burdened owner to receive
"compensation" only from third parties, whether they be motivated by charity
or by the requirements of an insurance contract.
Of course, there is a crucial disanalogy between purchases and takings:
takings are not voluntary exchanges, since the property's transfer is
compelled by the state. A "forced sale" is not the same as a "sale." As will
soon be clear, however, the fact that eminent domain is coercive does not
alter the conclusion that the entity taking the property is the entity required
to pay for it.
At an intuitive level, the fact that the state (the "buyer") has coerced an
owner into giving up property, rather than acquiring it with the owner's
permission, does not plausibly reduce the state's obligation to compensate
the burdened owner, nor does the state's acting coercively somehow make it
more appropriate for the state to require that the owner seek help from others
98. This conclusion is in tension with some older descriptions of the compensation obligation's
nature. For example, in 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he clause found in the
Constitutions of the several states providing for just compensation for property taken is a mere
limitation upon the exercise of the right [of a state to take property through eminent domain]." Boom
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879). The implication was that payment of compensation was
not inherently a necessary condition for an exercise of eminent domain to be legitimate, although a
constitution might choose to add such a requirement. See Thayer, supra note 61, at 251 ("[The right
of the State to take ... has no condition of compensation annexed to it, either precedent or
subsequent."). Other older cases disagreed. See, e.g., Gardner v. Trs. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch.
162, 166 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (Kent, C.) (asserting that provision of "fair compensation" is a "necessary
qualification accompanying the exercise of legislative power, in taking private property for public
uses," one that "is admitted by the soundest authorities, and is adopted by all temperate and civilized
governments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice"). The argument offered in this Article
casts doubt upon the soundness of the Boom Co. Court's approach.
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to mitigate the loss. If anything, the opposite would seem to be true: the
presence of coercion would only increase the grounds for insisting that the
coercer be the party who pays compensation.
However, this intuitive argument is merely suggestive rather than
conclusive because most ordinary cases of coerced transfers-e.g., thefts-
have the additional feature of being wrongful. Because one person's having
wronged another naturally suggests that the first person must compensate the
second, there might be a natural inclination to think that compensation for
coerced transfers is required, but only for tacit reasons that are not relevant
to transfers that are coerced yet not wrongful.
This possibility requires attention, because, as the next section will
discuss, a signal feature of eminent domain is that the state does not commit
a wrong when it exercises its power of eminent domain, even though taking
possession of property without the owner's consent is ordinarily a wrong.
Since ordinary judgments about the wrongfulness of coercive transfers
therefore do not apply to takings, perhaps ordinary judgments about
compensation also do not apply, and for similar reasons. However, as will
soon be evident, that inference does not follow. Examining the reason why
takings are not wrongs in fact confirms the conclusion that the government
owes compensation for property that it takes.
2. Necessity and Reasonable Accommodation.-The fact that the state
does not wrong owners when it exercises its power of eminent domain is
evident in how the law treats those exercises, most obviously in providing for
them at all. If exercising that power were wrongful, the appropriate response
would simply be to prohibit that exercise-to ban the government from
taking property or require the government to return the property that it
already took, not to permit the government to take property and keep it so
long as it merely pays the property's market value in return. Prohibition is in
fact how the law treats certain types of takings, namely those that fail to
satisfy the Constitution's "public use" requirement." Because takings purely
for private use are wrongs, owners can stop them altogether." By contrast,
takings for public use are routinely permitted. Indeed, it has long been said
99. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005) (stating the
unconstitutionality of a taking to confer "a private benefit on a particular private party" or "under
the mere pretext of a public purpose"); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896)
(holding that a taking for private, rather than public, use violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
100. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,245 (1984) ("A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose
of government and would thus be void.").
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that the power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of any government's
sovereignty. 101
Given therefore that the state does not act wrongly when it exercises its
power of eminent domain, it must be the case that the state has a right to take
property, at least under certain conditions. Equivalently, restated from the
perspective of the taken property's owner, it must be the case that, under
certain conditions, owners have a duty to yield their property to the
government that acts on that community's behalf.0 2 That observation
naturally prompts a further question: Why does this particular duty exist?
Since there is no obvious reason to think that eminent domain is sui
generis-a unique legal authority somehow separate from the rest of the
law-consulting the rest of property law can provide some illumination. The
universe of duties that community members may have toward each other is
potentially broad and varied.103 Familiar among them, however, is a general
responsibility not to inflict certain types of harm on other members of the
community.10 In property law, for example, these duties are evident in laws
101. See, e.g., Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The power of
eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent State."); Boom Co.,
98 U.S. at 406 ("The right of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public
uses, appertains to every independent government. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is an
attribute of sovereignty."); Prop. Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 375 P.3d 887,905 n.12 (Cal. 2016)
("California and federal authorities establish that eminent domain ... is 'an inherent attribute of
sovereignty' .... ."); H.W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAWS OF WAR 74
(1866) ("It is a right which, from its very nature, is inseparable from the sovereignty, and is
necessarily transferred with the sovereignty.").
102. Rights and duties ordinarily go together. For a classic discussion of the correlation between
rights and duties in legal theory, see Hohfeld, supra note 71, at 30-32. See also David Lyons, The
Correlativity ofRights and Duties, 4 Nots 45,45 & n.4 (1970) (collecting sources on the correlation
in the context of moral philosophy).
103. Although the idea that property owners have duties toward their communities is unlikely
to provoke vigorous opposition, some recent scholars have argued that those duties deserve more
attention than current property scholarship typically offers. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16 (2000) (criticizing theories that "obscure or deny
something important: owners have obligations as well as rights"); Gregory S. Alexander, The
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 745, 748 (2009) (arguing
that "the responsibility dimension of private ownership has been sorely under-theorized in American
law"); Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 771 (2009)
(examining an "enduring communitarian perspective" that offers "a functional vision of property as
the realm of deeply embedded relationships and community, with a normative focus on the
obligations that arise from these interconnections"); David Lametti, The Concept of Property:
Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325, 326 (2003) (proposing "a
new metaphor for understanding private property" that "allows specific objects of property to carry
with them duties of stewardship or obligations to use in a certain manner"); see also SANDEL, supra
note 72, at 240-41 (criticizing "moral individualism" for being unable to account for "familiar
features of our moral and political experience," including "the special responsibilities of family
members, and of fellow citizens, for one another").
104. This requirement has been established for so long that its standard formulation is in Latin:
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, commonly translated, "Use your own property so as not to harm
966
Uncompensated Takings
prohibiting trespass and nuisance.'0 5 This duty, however, is not absolute.
Thus, for example, courts will not enjoin reasonable uses of property as
nuisances, nor will they deem a trespass to have occurred when someone
fleeing a mortal threat seeks shelter on private property without
permission.106
These doctrines recognize that community membership requires some
accommodation of the interests of other members of the community-that is,
the existence of what one might call a duty of reasonable accommodation-10 7
Recognizing that duty makes it possible to restate why the government does
no wrong in taking, on behalf of the community, private property needed for
some beneficial public project: an owner has a duty of reasonable
accommodation toward his or her community, and the community's taking
the owner's property, when doing so is necessary for some public project,
does not exceed the community's corresponding right to receive that
reasonable accommodation.
However, a qualification embedded in that explanation is important to
make explicit: The absence of wrongdoing depends upon the taking's
necessity. If the project could proceed just as well without taking property
against its owners' wishes, impeding the state's acquisition of the property
would not harm the community, and therefore a duty of reasonable
accommodation would not extend to yielding that property to the
government.0 I Only if the taking is necessary will the duty apply."
that of another." See, e.g., 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 89 (2018) (interpreting the common law
maxim).
105. For an overview of trespass law, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 23-44 (3d ed.
2010). For an overview of nuisance law, see id. at 97-127.
106. See, e.g., Ploofv. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt 1908) (concerning a boat that moored to a
dock without permission to seek safety in a storm); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN
M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (2d ed.) (2011) (discussing "private necessity"); 2 id. § 399
(distinguishing nuisance from trespass on the basis of nuisance's requirement that the relevant
interference be unreasonable).
107. Cf Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. 55, 57 (1846) (Shaw, C.J.) ("All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights
of others, or to destroy or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community-, under the
maxim of the common law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non ladas."). Attempting to establish the
ultimate philosophical foundations for the existence of this duty would be far more ambitious than
needed to address the specific questions at issue in this Article. This Article's argument, by design,
assumes no commitment to any particular theory of the sources of political obligation. For present
purposes, it will be sufficient if the characterization of this duty is at least roughly plausible and is
broadly consistent with what can be observed in the law.
108. For a distinct but related idea, see Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional
Principle ofAbuse ofProperty Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1482 (2013) (identifying a category of
property doctrines that prevent "abuse of right").
109. See, e.g., 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.11[2][a][iii] (2018) (noting that "[b]efore
exercising the power of eminent domain there must be a determination that the taking is necessary
to advance a legitimate public purpose" and collecting cases). The necessity in question here is
disjunctive necessity. I.e., it is necessary to take some property within a given set of properties, and
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Now, in any system based more on notions of civic equality than on
caste privileges, the following proposition is likely to be uncontroversial:
While each property owner has certain duties to the political community to
which he or she belongs, merely by virtue of membership in that community,
by the same token, every other member also has duties toward the rest of that
community.110 The duties are reciprocal."' This proposition might not
receive universal assent, of course. For example, anarchists would deny the
existence of any duties at all toward a community.112 And some people might
reject the premise that civic equality does or should exist. Nevertheless, the
minimal observation that civic duties do exist is a nearly inescapable premise
of any account of government power and obligation, even if philosophers
the specific property that is taken belongs to that set Hence, taking Blackacre for a public project
will qualify as necessary even if the project could have proceeded just as well by taking Whiteacre
instead, provided merely that the project's success required taking one of the two. See, e.g., FITZ
RANDOLPH, supra note 93, at 49 ("The absolute necessity of a particular location is not in any case
a prerequisite to the exercise of the eminent domain. . . .).
110. That the existence of such duties depends on the existence of a specific type of relationship
between the person and the relevant community is evident in traditional rules limiting a country's
legal authority solely to particular geographic regions or groups of people. See, e.g., ANTONIO
CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-50 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing international law principles
governing the scope of states' sovereignty). Eminent domain is no exception to this general
restriction on governments' authority. Thus, the United States has no power of eminent domain over
property owned by foreigners in foreign countries. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 428, at 717 (3d ed. 1846) ("[R]eal estate, or immovable property, is
exclusively subject to the laws of the government, within whose territory it is situate."). Likewise,
within the United States, an individual state's power of eminent domain extends only to property
located within its borders. See, e.g., Crosby v. Hanover, 36 N.H. 404, 423 (1858) ("Our official
powers are confined to the limits of our own State, and the court in this case cannot require or
authorize the town to go into Vermont to take the property of the corporation there, and the
commissioners had no power to condemn property situated in that State.").
111. The notion that members of political society have reciprocal duties toward each other,
merely by virtue of their shared membership in that society, may seem obvious. Nevertheless,
various theorists have taken care to emphasize the point See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 51, at 772:
The mere fact of belonging or membership entails special responsibilities. Hence, land
ownership-like ownership at large-is perceived not merely as a bundle of rights, but
also as a social institution that creates bonds of commitment among landowners and
between landowners and others who live, work, or are otherwise affected by the
landowners' properties.
The historian James Kloppenberg identifies "the ethic of reciprocity" as one of the three "premises
that ... lie beneath modern democracy." JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, TOWARD DEMOCRACY: THE
STRUGGLE FOR SELF-RULE IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 9-10 (2016); see also
Christopher Serkin, Affirmative Constitutional Commitments: The State's Obligations to Property
Owners, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 109, 110-11 (2013) (arguing that the demands
of reciprocity both in Dagan's account and in progressive "human flourishing" theories of property
imply that the government sometimes has affirmative obligations to protect private property).
112. See, e.g., ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 72 (1998) (concluding,
somewhat reluctantly, that "[t]here would appear to be no alternative but to embrace the doctrine of
anarchism and categorically deny any claim to legitimate authority by one man over another").
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have long labored to identify the correct account of exactly why those duties
exist.' 13
Recognizing both necessity's essential role in justifying a taking and the
reciprocity of the duty of reasonable accommodation now makes evident why
the community must pay compensation for taken property.' 14 While one
member of a political community may have a duty not to impede something
that is necessary for attaining some public end, the other members of that
community equally have a duty not to impose more of a loss on that owner
than is necessary to attain that end. Each has duties of reasonable
accommodation toward the other, and inflicting unnecessary harm is not
reasonable."'
Refusing to compensate owners of taken property ordinarily is not
necessary to effectuate a project."' For example, although building a
highway connecting two towns is impossible without using property located
somewhere between them, it is perfectly possible both to build a highway and
to pay for the property used to do so.'11 (If any proof were needed of this fact,
113. That civic duties exist is obviously an essential presupposition of the entire legal system,
for without it, there would be no law at all. For a succinct survey of the contending accounts through
history of why those duties exist, see Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political Obligation, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIIDSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Fall 2014),
https://plato.stanford~edu/entries/political-obligation/ [https://perma.cc/Z86H-XBEW].
114. For an argument that reciprocal obligations may sometimes compel the government to
protect property, see Serkin, supra note 111, at 130-32.
115. See, e.g., E.L. Strobin, Annotation, Right to Condemn Property in Excess of Needs for a
Particular Public Purpose, 6 A.L.R. 3d § 2[a], at 297 (1966) (noting "the widely recognized
principle that the power of condemnation may not be used to condemn property in excess of that
needed for public purposes").
116. James Bradley Thayer noted, more than a century ago, the distinction between the need to
take property and the need to take without paying compensation. See Thayer, supra note 61, at
250-51 ("There is a necessity for the taking, but none for taking without compensation, or without
a just compensation, and such as shall put the party affected, so far as may be, on a level with the
rest of the community."). However, Thayer seems to have overlooked this distinction's implications.
He went on to argue that the government would not have "exercised its power wrongfully" if it
failed to pay compensation for property that it took because "the right of the State to take springs
from... a necessity of government," while owners' rights to compensation for taken property
spring from a different source-"the natural rights of the individual." Id. at 251. Whether a taking
is legitimate and whether compensation was owed were, Thayer thought, two independent
questions. The flaw in Thayer's argument arises from the distinction that Thayer himself had noted.
Even if taking property is necessary, it does not follow that taking the property without
compensation is necessary, and thus it does not follow that "necessity" gives the State the right to
engage in uncompensated takings.
117. In rare cases, circumstances may arise in which the government genuinely cannot pay for
the property that is needed for a public project. It may be that this distinct type of necessity (a need
not to pay compensation) might excuse or justify the government's not paying compensation or
paying only partial compensation. For a discussion of actual examples of this possibility, see Lee,
supra note 97, at 404-07. However, instances of non-compensation necessity are likely to be rare
because governments have the power to tax and thus generally can acquire the money needed to pay
compensation, even if political considerations would make them prefer not to.
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one could simply consult any road map and observe that highways in fact do
exist, despite the fact that the law has long required compensation for
property taken through eminent domain.) The necessity of taking certain
property for some public purpose depends on questions of geography,
geology, civil engineering, and the like. Those questions are entirely distinct
from the question of who pays for that property.
Thus, even when owners' duty of reasonable accommodation compels
them not to prevent necessary public use of their property, that duty
ordinarily does not extend to ceding their property without compensation.IsI
If the community fails to compensate the owner of the taken property, it
would violate the very same duty of reasonable accommodation that had
served to justify its taking the property without permission in the first place.
Thus, the community's paying compensation is a necessary condition for
exercises of eminent domain not to be wrongful."I The fact that the state
does not act wrongly when it takes property without the owner's permission
rests on an assumption that the state is paying compensation for what it takes.
Crucially here, the key assumption is not merely that someone-such as
an insurance company-happened to pay the owner a sum equal to the
compensation owed, thus mitigating the owner's loss, but rather that the
political community that benefited from the taking has done so.12 0 The
community will not have fulfilled its duty if someone else happens to step in
to do what the community was obligated to do. The relationship between the
party paying compensation and the party receiving it thus is essential to the
justification of a taking.
118. The same principle applies to trespasses that are compelled by private necessity. Such
incursions are not deemed to be wrongs, but nevertheless, compensation may be owed. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 197 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (indicating that a private-
necessity privilege exists for trespass but noting that where "entry is for the benefit of the actor or a
third person," the actor "is subject to liability for any harm done in the exercise of the privilege").
119. The role of compensation in takings is not to remedy a wrong but rather to prevent a wrong
from occurring in the first place. See Lee, supra note 97, at 401-04 (distinguishing among types of
compensation and referring to the role of compensation in eminent domain as "constitutive
compensation").
120. In practice, governments often borrow money to fund their expenses, including to pay
compensation. As a result, the people ultimately paying compensation may not be the same people
who decided to exercise the power of eminent domain or who initially benefited from the project.
This wrinkle does not affect the analysis here, because even though the identities of the individuals
who make up a community inevitably change as generations are born and pass away, the
communities themselves typically remain, and the rights, privileges, and obligations of membership
in that particular community are not determined solely by what happened during the time that each
current member has been alive and living within that community. (Over long enough periods of
time, of course, nearly every community will eventually disappear, just as the Roman Empire today
exists only in history books and the imagination. However, a community's lifetime is typically
substantially longer than the span of time over which the costs and benefits of any given exercise of
eminent domain are likely to be felt.)
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3. Taxation and Takings.-An additional implication of this account is
worth noting. Commentators have observed that any adequate theory of
takings compensation will need to be able to explain why taxation is
permissible even though uncompensated takings are not.12 ' The distinction
just noted between the necessity of imposing a harm and the necessity not to
compensate for that harm provides the required explanation. Governments
need to raise money through taxation, and doing so obviously is impossible
if they compensate each taxpayer for the value of the taxes paid.12 (The net
effect of such a compensation policy would be to raise exactly zero revenue
in taxes. Every dollar paid would immediately be refunded.) Thus, in the
special case of taxation, the need for the government to act and the need for
the government not to pay compensation for the burdens that act imposes are
inseparable, and the latter necessity legitimates non-compensation. 12 3
However, necessity's ability to legitimate what otherwise would be
impermissible extends only to what actually is necessary, and in ordinary
cases of takings only one of those two types of necessity is present-the
necessity to acquire the property in question.' 24 Since governments ordinarily
have the capacity to pay for property that necessity compels them to take,
121. See Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens
Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 191 (2002) ("Perhaps the most
surprising observation about recent commentary on drawing the line between taxation and takings
is its paucity. This is surprising since the issue is so fundamental."); Levmore, supra note 66, at 292
("[E]very theory of takings law should explain or at least struggle with the question of why the
power to tax-without compensation, of course-is not fundamentally inconsistent with the
constitutional obligation to compensate condemnees."). A survey of the relevant literature appears
in Kades, supra, at 191-208.
122. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 14, at 519 ("Compensation for taxation would nullify the tax
itself and, along with it, any prospect for raising revenue or implementing distributional policy.").
Taxation is not the only governmental policy with this feature. For example, Thomas Merrill has
noted:
[Tihe losses caused by governmental action are often deliberately inflicted to provide
incentives for private parties to take or avoid certain kinds of actions. A typical
pollution control regulation, for example, is imposed at least in part to discourage
polluting activities, through cost internalization. If the government compensated for
such losses, this incentive effect would be eliminated.
Merrill, supra note 64, at 1582.
123. Note that this account avoids any assumption that every taxpayer receives "in-kind'
compensation that equals or exceeds his or her tax burden. For a discussion of accounts that do rely
on such an assumption, see Kades, supra note 121, at 200-02. One problem with that assumption is
that it seems unlikely to be true. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 66, at 292 ("Broadly based taxes
that are used to finance a range of projects ... do not pretend to strike fair bargains with all
taxpayers, but, instead, benefit some citizens and burden others."). For a generally skeptical
assessment of arguments based on appeals to in-kind compensation, see generally Brian Angelo
Lee, Average Reciprocity ofAdvantage, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 99
(James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013).
124. Space does not permit examining whether the existence of reciprocal obligations not to
inflict unnecessary harm might also argue in favor of certain types of tax policies, such as utility-
equalizing "progressive" taxation.
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they are not exempt from paying that compensation. Taxation of property and
takings of property through eminent domain therefore are fundamentally
distinct.
It should now be clear that takings' not being wrongful despite being
coercive does not justify the government's refusing to compensate for what
it takes. To the contrary, the duty that explains why the coercion inherent in
eminent domain is not wrongful, combined with the reciprocal applicability
of that duty, together imply the opposite: compensation in fact is required.
Because of the relationship between the burdened owner and the community
that benefits from imposing that burden, justice inherently requires that the
community pay compensation, independent of any economic or other
instrumental considerations. The "just compensation" requirement reflects
the demands of relational justice.
D. Why Not Compensate for Every Cost of Legal Transitions?
One remaining question is how this relational justice account can answer
a challenge, commonly posed in the literature on just compensation, to
explain why the law should treat takings differently from the vast array of
other legal changes that inflict losses on individual members of a community
but routinely do not provide compensation.' 25
The first step in seeing how this account can meet that challenge is to
note that the existence of a prima facie reason to require compensation from
those who benefit by imposing burdens on others is not the same as a
conclusion that, all things considered, those who benefit should pay such
compensation. The latter implication will follow only if no countervailing
reasons exist that would outweigh the prima facie reason.
In this case, even if one assumes that the relational justice account
provides a prima facie reason to require compensation for a wide range of
government-imposed burdens, not just takings, a relevant countervailing
reason is immediately obvious: there is no practical way that the government
125. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 1677 ("But the fact is that most
government actions that harm citizens-from school closings to tax changes-do not entitle the
affected citizens to compensation."); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121
HMtV. L. REV. 1465, 1476 n.31 (2008) ("The traditional academic criticism of the obligation [to
compensate] is that government does not routinely compensate persons for losses incurred as a result
of other legal transitions-for instance, when government repeals a tax exemption or prohibits a
previously legal activity."). For a broader version of this challenge, based not only on losses caused
by the government but also on losses caused by other factors, see Kaplow, supra note 14, at
533-34 (noting earlier accounts that observed similarities between market risks and the risks of
losses from government action, and suggesting that "none of the distinctions they offer for treating
government and market risks differently withstands scrutiny"). Cf Merrill, supra note 64, at
1581-82 (asserting that "[t]he insurance theory [that compensation serves to maximize wealth by
pooling risk for the benefit of risk-averse members of society] fails to explain why we willingly
compensate in some cases while refusing to compensate in others").
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could possibly compensate for every loss that its actions impose. Legal
change happens every day, and changes that leave absolutely everyone better
off are rare at best.126 As a practical matter, therefore, compensating for every
burden imposed by the state is simply impossible.'2 7 The costs of a system of
universal compensation for such burdens would be prohibitively high.128
Necessity therefore compels the state not to pay compensation for every loss
that it imposes, and as noted earlier, the law has long held that necessity can
legitimate what otherwise would be impermissible. 12 9
As a result, the existence of reciprocal duties of reasonable
accommodation does not imply that the community, acting through the
government, has an all-things-considered duty to compensate for every
burden that it imposes. An impossible accommodation is not reasonably
demanded. However, the fact that compensating for every loss is impossible
does not imply that communities need not compensate for any loss. Even if
limited resources preclude doing the best thing all the time, that limitation
does not justify failing to do the best thing to the extent possible. The question
then is why, if some burdens must receive compensation while others
necessarily do not, eminent domain falls in the former category rather than
the latter. I.e., Why do takings losses have priority over other losses that
follow from government action?
Although a general theory of losses from government action lies outside
the scope of this Article, it is easy to identify one clear distinction among two
126. In fact, even changes that make some people better off while leaving everyone else's
situations unchanged (and thus no worse off)-i.e., 'Tareto superior" changes-are rare in practice.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, What (IfAnything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1791, 1795 (2003) (reviewing LOUIs KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE (2002)) ("In reality, however, Pareto improvements are often hard to find. Because
unanimous consent is unlikely to exist for changes in legal rules, law and economics practitioners
often fall back to a broader but less compelling standard, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.").
127. Cf Michelman, supra note 52, at 1178-79:
[Tbo insist on full compensation to every interest which is disproportionately burdened
by a social measure dictated by efficiency would be to call a halt to the collective
pursuit of efficiency. It would require a tracing of all impacts, no matter how remote,
speculative, or arguable, and a valuation of all burdens, no matter how idiosyncratic or
imponderable. If satisfactory performance of such an obligation is not absolutely
impossible, at least it is clear that in many situations its costs would be prohibitive.
128. Cf Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 599-600:
[M]arket failure provides a rationale for considering the payment of compensation not
only when land is taken by eminent domain, but also when zoning changes or other
governmental regulations affect land values. But this does not mean that compensation
should be provided in all cases of insurance market failure. There are a number of costs
associated with compensation, and we can only conclude that compensation ought to
be paid when the benefits outweigh the costs.
129. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 106, § 117, at 362 (discussing how "private
necessity" may "protect defendants whose acts in emergencies would otherwise count as trespass
to land or chattels or as conversion").
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broad categories of losses, based on the relationship between those losses and
the benefit that the community receives from imposing them: some losses are
incidental to the benefit, while other losses contribute to the benefit.
For example, a decision to build a multilane expressway between two
cities may ultimately reduce the profitability of small businesses that are
located along a smaller, pre-existing highway.130 Such losses, although real,
do not themselves create the public benefits that creating the expressway
generates. Those benefits relate to the speed and ease of travel between the
two cities. The fact that businesses along the formerly popular route have lost
customers does not cause travel along the expressway to be any faster or
easier. Thus, these businesses' losses are merely an incidental side-effect of
the new expressway's construction.
By contrast, a law that requires every citizen to serve in the military
imposes a burden-mandatory military service-that cannot be separated
from the benefits of having a larger military. In this case, the burden of
serving in the military actually produces the benefit of a larger military.
Unlike the losses suffered by downtown businesses when a freeway bypass
opens, the losses suffered by unwilling conscripts contribute to the benefits
of universal military service.
All else being equal, a community's obligation to pay compensation
when it benefits by imposing a loss on one of its members intuitively seems
stronger than its obligation to compensate people who suffer losses that are
merely incidental side-effects of socially beneficial actions. In the latter case,
the loss is regrettable, and the community would have preferred to avoid it;
in the former case, the loss actually provides the benefit.
Although developing a philosophical foundation for that intuition lies
outside the scope of this Article, the intuition itself has been widely held. One
sign of its appeal is the enduring philosophical relevance of the "Doctrine of
Double Effect." Originally formulated in the thirteenth century, the Doctrine
is an analytical tool for assessing the moral permissibility of actions that have
multiple effects, some of which would ordinarily be morally impermissible.
One of the Doctrine's key criteria is whether an action's morally problematic
effects play an instrumental role in achieving the action's goal-in which
case the action is deemed morally impermissible-or instead are merely
unintended side-effects, in which case the action may be morally permissible
(if other criteria, not relevant here, are also satisfied).13 1 Although the
130. This example is not purely hypothetical. See, e.g., Kaid Benfield, The Death-and Life-
ofSmall Downtown America, CflYLAB (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/work/201209
/how-main-street-can-be-saved/3200/ [https://perma.cc/SH4Y-AKTM] (describing how the
creation of interstate highway bypasses hurt small businesses that were located in downtown
shopping areas).
131. The Doctrine of Double Effect's origin is commonly attributed to THOMAS AQUINAS, 2
SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. II, question 64, art. 7 (Benzinger Brothers, Inc. 1947) (13th c.). One of
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Doctrine is not universally accepted among philosophers, the seriousness
with which it is still taken in formal moral thought is testimony to the intuitive
appeal of its core distinction."3 2
In the specific context of takings, the basic implications of the
distinction between incidental and contributory losses are straightforward.
Exercises of eminent domain fall squarely within the realm of losses imposed
in order to produce a benefit, while many other losses from legal transitions
are merely incidental to the benefits that those legal changes obtain.
Therefore, in a world of limited resources, losses from eminent domain
would inherently have a stronger claim for compensation than losses from
those other transitions would, all else being equal.133
That fact, however, cannot be the whole story. As a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court noted in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. :134
In the course of regulating commercial and other human affairs,
Congress routinely creates burdens for some that directly benefit
others. For example, Congress may set minimum wages, control
prices, or create causes of action that did not previously exist. Given
the propriety of the governmental power to regulate, it cannot be said
that the Taking Clause is violated whenever legislation requires one
person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.1 35
The Court's observation highlights the fact that a state-imposed
burden's priority for receiving compensation may depend on multiple
considerations, not just on the relationship between the burdened party and
the benefited party. 136 In particular in the takings context, a critical additional
consideration is whether the burden in question involves interference with
rights to property, as opposed to some other rights. The Fifth Amendment's
requirement that just compensation be paid applies only when "private
property" has been taken. Regulatory measures such as price controls and
minimum wages--examples that the Connolly court offered-do benefit
some by means of burdening others, but in neither case are the imposed
the seminal sources of the Doctrine's present-day scholarly interest is Philippa Foot, The Problem
ofAbortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5 (1967).
132. The philosophical literature on the doctrine is now voluminous. For a recent overview, see
Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/
[https://perma.cc/GVT5-T38A].
133. Jed Rubenfeld has argued that the "just compensation" requirement should apply solely to
instances of the government taking possession of property and using it. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102
YALE L.J. 1077, 1149 (1993). Although the analysis in the present Article agrees with Rubenfeld in
treating transfers of possession as the quintessential type of taking, it does not imply that such
"usings" are the only type of action that qualifies as a "taking" and thus requires compensation.
134. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
135. Id. at 223.
136. Among the other relevant considerations may be the extent to which the burdens imposed
are unequal. This Article does not contend that the "equal treatment" account discussed in
subpart I(B) is entirely wrong, but rather that, at best, it is only part of the story.
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burdens interferences with property rights. A general interest in being able to
charge more for what one sells or to pay less for what one purchases is simply
not property. Thus, the fact that the government is not required to compensate
those who are burdened by regulations abridging these lesser, non-property
interests does not show that compensation is not owed when property is
taken.
In practice, determining which rights qualify as property rights thus will
be critical for determining whether a particular government-imposed burden
requires compensation or not. Likewise, a fully comprehensive theoretical
account of compensation requirements ideally would explain why property
is or should be given the special status that it has in the law. However,
creating a complete general theory of property that would resolve those issues
is not necessary for present purposes. The account offered in this Article
focuses only on the core case of takings-coercive acquisitions of tangible
property-and it is now clear why those acquisitions are justifiably treated
differently from other losses that the government may impose. What light
this account might shed on more remote applications of takings principles,
such as regulatory takings, is a question that can be left to another day.
m. Assessing the Economic Case
If the discussion thus far has been convincing, then the intrinsic
importance of the government's paying compensation for taken property is
clear. Independent of any concerns about economic efficiency, relational
justice requires that the community that benefited by taking property
compensate the owner who was burdened by that taking.
So far, however, this argument has shown only that such compensation
is intrinsically important. It has not yet addressed whether that importance is
sufficient to justify requiring compensation even in light of the efficiency
gains supposedly offered by replacing government compensation with
private insurance.1 7
137. The discussion that follows will simply grant, for the purposes of argument, the anti-
compensation thesis's assumption that private insurance against takings losses would be available
to purchase if the government were to stop compensating for takings. That assumption is
controversial but ultimately speculative and therefore impossible to assess conclusively a priori.
See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 13, at 593-96 (attributing the absence of a private market
for takings insurance to moral hazard and adverse-selection problems); Jonathan S. Masur &
Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391,
421-26 (2010) (discussing the difficulties of pricing insurance against the risks of legal transitions);
see also Farber, supra note 17, at 285 (noting the "element of speculation" in this debate and
asserting that "conjecture" about whether a private market would arise "is not a satisfying basis for
either a positive or a normative theory").
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How to address conflicts between intrinsic concerns of justice and
instrumental concerns about efficiency is a perennially thorny question. 138
Fortunately, in the present case, that question can safely be set aside because
it is relevant only when such a conflict exists--that is, only when adopting
the intrinsically just policy would appreciably diminish social efficiency. As
will become evident, in the case of takings compensation there is no actual
conflict.
Existing discussions of the anti-compensation thesis pay surprisingly
little attention to the question of how much social efficiency is actually at
stake. They argue that the just-compensation requirement creates a moral
hazard and inflates administrative costs, but they offer no estimate of the size
of those effects.'13 As this Part will explain, the supposed moral hazard is
likely to arise only rarely, if ever, and any administrative cost savings would
likely be minimal. Meanwhile, switching from government compensation to
private insurance would actually reduce efficiency by increasing information
costs and distorting incentives. Hence, any net efficiency gains from
replacing government compensation with private insurance would likely be
small or nonexistent, and thus would provide no reason to set aside the
requirements of relational justice.
A. How Much Is at Stake?
1. How Frequently Would the Moral Hazard Arise?-As noted in Part I,
one central pillar of the anti-compensation thesis is the argument that
government compensation for taken property creates incentives for owners
to improve their properties even when doing so is socially inefficient." If
this moral hazard were a significant problem, one would expect to find
widespread evidence of actual costly improvements that have been made
despite owners' awareness that those improvements likely would be taken
and destroyed.1 41 Thus, it is striking that the anti-compensation literature
offers few concrete examples drawn from actual exercises of eminent
138. This question is merely a specific instance of a longstanding general philosophical
problem of how to decide what moral judgments should result when incommensurable values clash.
See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, Conflicts of Values (noting the existence of "a plurality of values
which can conflict with one another, and which are not reducible to one another. . ."), in MORAL
LuCK PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 71 (1981).
139. For an impassioned assertion of the importance of assessing the sizes of alleged economic
effects, rather than merely establishing that an effect exists or may exist, see Deirdre McCloskey,
The Trouble with Mathematics and Statistics in Economics, HIST. ECON. IDEAS, 2005, at 85, 88-
90.
140. See supra section I(A)(1).
141. In general, cases in which improvements are made immediately before condemnation are
not by themselves evidence of moral hazard unless the owner both recognized and discounted the
risk of condemnation. The mere fact of a short gap in time between the improvement and the taking
implies nothing by itself.
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domain.14 2 The scarcity of actual examples becomes unsurprising, however,
once one realizes that this particular moral hazard rarely would produce
inefficient results.
One reason that the moral hazard is likely to be irrelevant in practice is
that the number of improvements that even could be inefficient in this way is
apt to be quite small. The hazard would arise and be costly only when all
three of the following are true: (1) owners decided to make expensive
improvements to their property; (2) the expected value of those
improvements, given the probability of a taking, was negative; and (3) the
government actually did take that property, making the owners' investments
go to waste. In reality, however, many owners never improve their property
beyond modest maintenance; very little property is ever taken by the
government; and even owners who improved property that the government
ultimately took may, by luck, have made those improvements when
(unknown to those owners) the improvements' expected value was in fact
142. One recent article asserted:
Numerous cases have come before our courts where improvements were made to land
immediately prior to its condemnation .... These examples of eminent domain
resulted in the demolition of millions of dollars worth of buildings and improvements
that might never have been constructed at the outset if the landowners involved were
properly incentivized to account for the risk that their property could be taken.
Calandrillo, supra note 34, at 506-07. To its credit, that article cites four actual cases to support its
assertion, a helpful improvement on the typical practice of resting the moral hazard concern on
purely hypothetical examples. However, the four cases cited provide little evidence of any
significant moral hazard. The strongest cited example is a Maryland case that does indeed involve
an owner's improving property despite having good reason to anticipate the government's taking it,
but, even in this case, the government admitted that the owner's improvements might have been
compatible with the use that the government would make of the property. Hence, the social cost of
the improvement here may have been negligible. J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.-Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 792 A.2d 288, 305-06 (Md. 2002). In another cited case, there was no evidence
that the improvement's builder anticipated losing the property, and in fact the government's decision
to take was a reaction to the improvement's commencement. Div. of Bond Fin. of Dep't of Gen.
Servs. v. Rainey, 275 So. 2d 551, 553 (Fla. 1973). In a third case, the property increased in value
before the taking, but there was no indication that the increase was the result of any improvements
rather than merely a rise in the real estate market, and the court explicitly said that there was "no
indication that the increase in value of defendant's property was due to bad faith improvements by
defendant. . . ." Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 97 Cal. App. 4th 895, 906 (2002), as modified
on denial of reh'g. Finally, in the remaining case, the "improvements" were crops that had been
planted in the ordinary course of farming-raspberries that had been planted two years before the
taking was authorized, Christmas trees that had been planted seven years before the taking was
authorized, and hay that had been planted recently but that the government was able to reap and sell.
Town of Newington v. Estate of Young, 777 A.2d 219, 238-41 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000). It seems
unlikely that eliminating whatever moral hazard existed in this case would have avoided significant
costs, if any at all.
978
2019] Uncompensated Takings 979
positive. Hence, the set of possibly inefficient "excess" improvements is
likely to be quite small.143
Moreover, owners' disregarding the probability of a taking will reduce
efficiency only if the opposite course of action-i.e., attempting to consider
that probability-would not have been futile. If owners are unable to assess
that probability with sufficient precision and accuracy to make optimal
decisions, then discouraging them from considering it will have no practical
effect other than avoiding wasted effort." Unfortunately, there is little
reason to believe that owners ordinarily have this ability, since it is not clear
how even moderately well-informed owners could assign anything other than
a vague probability to the risk that their property will be taken. 145
143. SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 132-33 concedes that the infrequency of takings may limit the
efficiency gains from eliminating compensation's moral hazard but appears not to see that fact as
raising doubts about the desirability of eliminating the compensation requirement.
144. In a related vein, Thomas Miceli notes that "an important shortcoming of the existing
literature on efficient compensation rules" is that the economic models it uses "simply assume that
the court has the necessary information without worrying about how it acquired it" MICELI, supra
note 22, at 112. Miceli ultimately simply resigns himself to accepting the difficulty. "In the end, all
we can say is that some residual inefficiencies are the unavoidable cost of relying on non-market
allocation mechanisms that require information that the government or the courts cannot easily
obtain." Id. He seems not to have noticed that private owners face the same information problem,
nor the implications of that fact for the moral hazard argument.
145. Abraham Bell has suggested that when considering "the efficiency of property
development, it may not be necessary to quantify the 'takings risk . . .'" Abraham Bell, Not Just
Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 56 (2003). Bell's suggestion springs from a
general idea that if "the market in which the care is to be exercised is considered roughly efficient"-
by which Bell seems to mean that the widespread, established practices in the relevant field of action
produce socially efficient outcomes-then an individual could identify the socially optimal course
of action in a given instance simply by conforming to those practices. Id. Thus, in the takings
context, "we might determine the reasonable standard of property development by reference to
similar properties in similar locations." Id. This suggestion has two fundamental problems. One
basic problem is that markets and social practices are not inherently efficient; they become efficient
as a result of the informed decisions of the many participants in those markets or practices. Hence,
if it is impossible for Person A to identify the socially efficient development decision in the face of
potential takings-e.g., because the information necessary to make the required expected-value
calculations is unavailable-then it will do no good to tell Person A just to do what Persons B, C,
D, E, and F have done, since all of those people made their decisions burdened by the same
information constraints that affect Person A's decision. Under certain circumstances, aggregating
predictions made by basically knowledgeable people can harness what James Surowiecki
popularized as the "wisdom of crowds," and thus arrive at a more accurate prediction than any of
those individuals would have made alone. JAMES SUROWIECIG, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv
(2004). However, this aggregation procedure can only refine the knowledge that was implicit in
each individual prediction; it cannot make something out of nothing. Thus, for example, in one of
Surowiecki's famous examples, the location of a vanished submarine was determined with
remarkable accuracy by aggregating the guesses of "a team of men with a wide range of knowledge,
including mathematicians, submarine specialists, and salvage men." Id. at xx-xxi. However, had
the searchers not consulted experts but instead aggregated the guesses of ordinary people with no
relevant technical expertise, the resulting prediction might have been slightly less bad than any
individual layperson's prediction, but it still would have been useless. One cannot bootstrap oneself
from ignorance to knowledge by conforming one's views to those of other people who are equally
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As a result, many scenarios in which considering the risk of a taking
theoretically would change a landowner's investment decisions never would
arise in practice. For example, recall the hypothetical example described in
Part I: an improvement project that costs $4,000 and will return $5,000 if the
government does not take the property but zero dollars if the government
does take it. The expected value of undertaking that project would then
depend on the probability of the government's taking the property. If that
probability is 15%, then the project's net expected value would be positive
and society would benefit from the project, but if that probability is 25%,
then the net expected value would be negative, and the project is socially
inefficient.1" The main point of the moral hazard argument is that the
availability of government-provided compensation will lead the owner to
ignore the risk of a taking, and thus to build the improvement irrespective of
whether the probability of a taking is 25% or 15%.
But the blame for this undesirable effect cannot be placed on the
availability of government compensation unless, in the absence of such
compensation, the owner actually would have been sensitive to that particular
difference in probabilities. And, in reality, there is little reason to expect
owners to be able to estimate the risk of expropriation with sufficient
precision and accuracy to distinguish situations where the chance of
condemnation is 15% from situations where that chance is 25%.147 At best,
ignorant See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 25
(2006) (asserting that "[t]he accuracy of judgments of statistical groups is best explained by
reference to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," which rests on an assumption that "each person [in the
group] is more likely than not to be correct"); Dan Cassino, The "Wisdom of the Crowd" Has a
Pretty Bad Track Record at Predicting Jobs Reports, HARv. BUS. REv. (July 8, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/07/the-wisdom-of-the-crowd-has-a-pretty-bad-track-record-at-predicting-
jobs-reports [https://perma.cc/M9HZ-PFM7] (noting that "aggregation doesn't get rid of any errors
that are shared across the people being aggregated"). Moreover, even if by some fortunate accident,
other property owners' decisions in the face of potential takings happened to be efficient, that happy
situation would not help an owner who lacked adequate information about the probability that his
or her property would be taken. To follow Bell's proposal, such an owner would need to identify
the decisions that others had made in situations similar to the owner's-i.e., made when the
probability of a taking was similar in size to the probability that this owner faces. But the ability to
identify properties that faced a similar probability of being taken depends on already being able to
determine both the probability that one's own property will be taken and the probabilities that those
other properties would have been taken. Since the ability to adequately assess the probability of a
parcel's being taken is exactly what the owner lacks, and is exactly what Bell's suggestion aspired
to make unnecessary, Bell's proposal provides no way to avoid the problem of inadequate
information.
146. If the risk of condemnation is 15%, then the project's net expected value would be
[(0.85)*(5000) + (0.15)*(0)] - 4000 = $250. If the risk is 25%, then the net expected value would
be -$250. The "break-even" point occurs when the probability of a taking is 20%. In that case, the
expected value of the project would be (0.8)*(5000) + (0.2)*(0) = $4000, which exactly equals the
project's $4000 cost, producing a net expected value of $0.
147. If the owner has purchased private insurance against takings, then the premiums charged
by the insurance company to insure the contemplated improvement should reflect the risk that the
improvement will be taken by the government. This price signal might enable the owner to know
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owners are likely to be able to make only very rough assessments of
condemnation risk-e.g., that it is "negligible," "low," or "high."l4 8 Hence,
much of the time, the efficient decision may simply be unknown to the
decision maker, and thus any moral hazard will have no practical effect.149
Moreover, even when the necessary calculations are possible, one might
expect owners naturally to avoid building improvements that have a
substantial risk of being taken, since an improver's goal is not to break even
by having the improvement taken and reimbursed, but rather to enjoy the
improvement, including by making plans for its use that would come to
fruition only after the time of the likely taking. 5 0 Presented with a substantial
likelihood that any improvement would be taken, such an owner would
already have good reason to avoid building the improvement there, and
instead to sell the property, buy land elsewhere, and build where he could
count on enjoying the value that he had purchased. 5 1
when the project would be socially efficient and when it would not. But even if insurance companies
would have better information about takings than individual owners do, there is no obvious reason
to think that they could reliably distinguish between situations with a 15% risk of a taking and
situations with a 25% risk. Takings occur infrequently enough and in a wide enough diversity of
circumstances that insurers would lack sufficient data to generate such precise estimates.
148. Steven Shavell's hypothetical illustration of the moral hazard problem involves an
improvement that would have a positive expected value only if the probability of the government's
taking the property is less than 20% but that the owner chose to undertake despite the probability of
a taking's being 40%. SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 131. Shavell's example thus relies on owners'
being able accurately to distinguish situations in which the probability of a taking is 20% from
situations in which that probability is 40%. In practice, it seems much more likely that in both cases
owners would be able to say only that a taking seems unlikely but possible, and thus they would be
unable to make the calculation upon which Shavell's argument rests.
149. This objection applies equally to arguments that justify the "just compensation"
requirement on the grounds that without such compensation risk-averse owners may make fewer
investments than is socially optimal. For an example of this sort of argument, see Dagan, supra note
51, at 749-50 (asserting that "no-compensation regime[s] may also generate inefficiencies" by
producing under-investment in assets potentially subject to takings).
150. Moreover, the owner cannot always be certain of breaking even, because there is always
a risk that the government's estimate of the property's market value will be inaccurate. For example,
Yun-Chien Chang has argued that in practice the value of improvements to property is often not
included in the calculation of that property's fair market value when takings compensation is
calculated. YTIN-CHIEN CHANG, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TAKINGs COMPENSATION 27-30 (2013).
Risk-averse owners would prefer to avoid that sort of hazard. Owners also might naturally prefer to
avoid the frustration of seeing what they built be demolished.
151. Adding to that incentive is the risk that widespread knowledge of the possibility that
property in that area might be taken will, over time, cause a substantial drop in that property's market
value and thus in the amount of compensation received. See Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight:
Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 767-69 (1973) (discussing how,
because government projects take time, "notice that a taking is imminent becomes widespread,
which in turn promotes a wholesale departure of tenants, reluctance on the part of owners in the
affected area to invest in improvements and maintenance, and distortion of the real estate market").
Note that, for the purposes of compensation, taken property's fair market value is determined as of
the date of the taking, not as of an earlier date when the possibility of a taking began to be
anticipated. See Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015) ("The Court has repeatedly
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The incentive simply to move and build elsewhere is especially strong
if the improvement is for commercial purposes because construction takes
time. An owner who builds a revenue-producing improvement, such as an
office building, even though that property is likely to be taken, will have to
build the improvement twice-once on the current parcel and another time
on the new parcel after the first parcel is taken. Since the improvement cannot
generate profit until it has been built, this second course of action would be
more costly than moving immediately to another parcel and building there." 2
For example, if creating the improvement takes one year, then by building on
the soon-to-be condemned parcel, the owner will miss out on two years of
potential profits rather than just one-profits from the year spent building the
first building, and then profits from the second year spent building a new
building after the first building was taken. Since the government generally
does not compensate for takings' consequential losses, such as lost profits,
the owner would have a strong economic incentive to avoid that unnecessary
loss.153
Thus, in practice, the frequency with which the purported moral hazard
would actually lead to socially inefficient investment seems close to zero.5
Those owners who were oblivious or merely lacked unusually precise
information about the probability that their property would be taken would
not be able to make the optimal decision anyway (except by chance), and
those who did have that information would likely prefer simply to move and
held that just compensation normally is to be measured by the market value of the property at the
time of the taking." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
152. For a related argument, see Kanner, supra note 151, at 768 ("What businessman in his
right mind would buy or lease under such circumstances? Why should he remodel, install trade
fixtures, buy stock-in-trade, and develop goodwill for his business, only to have it all confiscated
when the threatened condemnation comes?").
153. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925) (denying any obligation to
compensate owners of taken property for consequential losses to their business as a result of the
taking); 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12B.09 (2018) (collecting sources excluding evidence
of past and future profits from consideration).
154. The moral hazard argument for the anti-compensation principle faces the additional critical
difficulty that, even if the hazard were large, it would not imply that the government should pay
zero compensation. Instead, it would leave the correct level of compensation indeterminate. As
Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro noted, paying any fixed amount of compensation would eliminate
the moral hazard in question. Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 78. In fact, any
compensation scheme that disconnects the amount of compensation received from the value of the
taken improvements would work, including randomly determining the amount of compensation to
be paid or paying a sum equal to the average value that improvements on similarly sized property
have. More complicated, but also potentially effective, is Fischel and Shapiro's suggestion that the
government pay property owners for options to take their property without compensating for any
improvements built on it. See Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 55, at 274 ("One way of dealing with
the moral hazard problem is for the government to purchase in advance of the landowner decisions
an option to take the property without paying for lost capital."). Such an approach, in effect, simply
amounts to making a partial taking with compensation.
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build elsewhere.'s As a result, any efficiency gains from eliminating that
hazard likely would be negligible.
2. The Hope of Administrative Cost Savings.-The second pillar of the
anti-compensation thesis is the argument that replacing government
compensation with private insurance would reduce administrative costs, thus
saving money for all taxpayers, including property owners. In fact, however,
any net savings in administrative costs are likely to be meager, at best.
Hypothetically, competition among private-insurance providers might
encourage diligence in eliminating administrative waste, and that
encouragement might in turn lead to lower administrative costs."' However,
there is no obvious reason to believe that the current administrative costs of
eminent domain compensation are excessive. Hence, the efficiency gains that
are available even in theory may be few, and if so, then any improvement
caused by competition would only be minor. Outside of simple faith in the
power of private markets and the irremediable inefficiency of government,
there is no reason to think that the potential administrative-cost savings here
are substantial at all.
One way that replacing government compensation with private
insurance might nevertheless appear to reduce administrative costs is if that
private alternative were to offer fewer procedural protections for owners-
e.g., fewer opportunities to challenge the accuracy of the value placed on the
taken property."5 ' However, while removal of procedural safeguards-just
like the removal of safeguards in general-might reduce the monetary costs
of operating a system, it would do so only at the expense of increasing the
risk of the kind of harm that the safeguard was intended to prevent (such as
erroneous valuations). Since the optimal level of procedural protections
cannot be known a priori, one cannot assume that any reduction of
administrative costs by reducing procedural protections really would be
socially efficient rather than merely a false economy.
155. Bad-faith improvements made merely to "punish" the government by increasing its cost
of taking the property already are excluded from the compensation that the government must pay.
See 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.12[3] (2018) (collecting cases).
156. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 178 ("The discipline of competition causes
a higher level of administrative efficiency in private insurance funds than in state insurance funds.");
Calandrillo, supra note 34, at 507-08 (explaining incentives for private insurers to minimize
administrative costs).
157. Both Kaplow and Shavell seem to have had this potential source of savings in mind. See
SHAvELL, supra note 4, at 129 (suggesting that "insurance-related administrative costs would be
lower than" state-compensation-related administrative costs because "the process by which the state
determines the amount of compensation is likely to be more cumbersome than insurers'
procedures"); Kaplow, supra note 14, at 547 (noting that state-compensation-related administrative
costs may be higher because "government institutions ... rely upon review procedures that typically
are more costly than those used by private parties in similar contexts").
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Moreover, switching to a system of competing insurance providers
would introduce other costs. One arises from a reduction in risk-spreading,
the other from an increase in solvency risk.
In general, the economic motivation for insurance rests upon the
benefits obtainable by spreading across many insured parties risks that would
otherwise be concentrated on a few people.'18 Because risk-spreading is the
key to effective insurance, the larger the pool of insured parties over which
the risks are spread, the better, all else being equal.159 If the government
provides compensation for takings losses, then the relevant pool is effectively
all taxpayers-in other words, almost everyone. But if private insurance is
used instead, then each competing insurance company will necessarily have
a markedly smaller pool over which to spread its risks and thus will be able
to provide insurance only at a higher cost. 1o
A second, related cost springs from the fact that private-insurance
companies face solvency risk-the possibility that, through misfortune or
mismanagement, a company may not be able to pay all of the claims that it
receives. Even when that risk is low, it will inevitably still exceed the risk of
the government's becoming insolvent and unable to pay its debts, because
only the government has the power to raise money through taxation.' 6 ' Thus,
switching from government compensation to private insurance imposes
additional risk on property owners, and that risk in turn gives property owners
reason to monitor the solvency of the firms that insure them against takings
losses. Such monitoring, when possible at all, requires an additional
investment of resources.
How large these additional costs would be relative to the supposed
reduction in costs from competitive pressures or attenuated procedures is an
empirical question. Unfortunately, answering that question would be difficult
or impossible, since doing so would require measuring the costs of an
alternative compensation system that does not exist. What can be said is that
even if switching to private insurance did reduce some administrative costs,
there is no reason to think that this reduction would be large, and since such
a switch would simultaneously increase other costs, the change's net
economic effect is unlikely to be significantly positive and might even be
negative.
158. See KLEIN, supra note 29, at 6 (explaining the concept of diversification of risk).
159. See id. at 7 ("Risk and uncertainty is reduced through... the greater predictability of
losses achieved by increasing the number of members of the pool.").
160. For a similar argument, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 22, at 178 ('The state can spread
the risk of takings through the base of all taxpayers, which is broader than the base of all policy
holders in any insurance company. So, risk-spreading argues for public insurance.").
161. Reinsurance can potentially reduce this extra risk, but only at an extra expense, and cannot
eliminate it. See generally 44A AM. JuR. 2D Insurance § 1812 (2016) (describing the concept of
reinsurance).
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B. Additional Costs ofPrivate Insurance
Switching to private insurance also would incur two additional sets of
costs that the anti-compensation argument overlooks. One set involves
information costs, and the other involves distorted incentives. 162
1. Information Costs.-Eliminating government compensation for taken
property would require that owners who are considering improving their
property, or companies who would insure those improvements against
takings, estimate the probability that the government will take that
improvement before it exhausts its useful life. That calculation is, of course,
what the anti-compensation thesis relies upon to avoid the moral hazard that
government compensation allegedly creates.16 1 As noted earlier, owners
likely will often be unable to obtain these estimates at all, at least with the
accuracy and precision needed to make those estimates.xes
However, even if those estimates were feasible, acquiring the
information needed to make them would be costly. At best, obtaining the
relevant publicly available information would require constant monitoring
and assessment of the public statements of government officials, agencies,
and legislatures. And, quite likely, an accurate estimate would require access
to a wide range of data that are not readily available to private entities at all,
such as the content of government deliberations and the government's
internal estimates of the social value of various public project alternatives.
Insurance companies might be able to acquire that information, either licitly
or illicitly, despite these obstacles, but only at additional expense.
Compounding the problem, the probability of a taking might change
over time. Thus, owners who undertook projects requiring significant time to
complete could not rely on just one estimate, made at the project's outset, of
the probability of a taking but rather would need continually to reassess the
probability of a taking, in order to determine whether they should continue
the project or instead abandon it.
Of course, removing the government's compensation obligation would
decrease the government's own information costs because the government
would no longer need to determine the precise market value of any taken
improvements in order to pay the correct amount in compensation. However,
this reduction in information costs would occur only in those few cases in
162. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky warn that creating a situation in which the
government has nonpublic information (about what property will be taken) that is economically
significant both to owners and insurance companies would create socially costly incentives for rent-
seeking. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 1711-12. That potential consequence of limited
information is independent of the information-costs concern raised here.
163. See supra section I(A)(1).
164. See supra section I(A)(1).
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which the government actually takes property-or at least seriously plans to
take property-while owners' information costs would increase every time
owners consider making an improvement to their property. In any given year,
the number of property improvements undertaken or contemplated
presumably dwarfs the number of improvements that the government
takes. 16  Thus, the net effect of removing the government's compensation
obligation likely would be an increase in total information costs.
2. Private Companies and Fiscal Incentives.-Additional social costs
may arise from the creation of inefficient incentives. If governments respond
to political pressure, then replacing government compensation with private
insurance might result in the government's taking property less often than it
should.1" Since every profit-oriented business has an incentive to reduce its
expenses, private companies who provide insurance against takings would
have a strong incentive to lobby governments to reduce the use of eminent
domain. 67 Insurance companies are exactly the sort of concentrated interest
endowed with ample economic resources that are commonly thought to have
considerable political influence.'6 Hence, this self-interested lobbying might
be especially effective in shaping governments' decisions about which
projects to undertake or to forego."'
165. Unfortunately that presumption is necessarily speculative. Surprisingly, no tally of the
frequency of eminent domain seizures appears to exist. See U.S. GOv'T AccOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION ABOUT ITS USES AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY
OWNERS AND COMMuNrrIEs Is LIMITED 8 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD77-M.YX] ("[W]e were unable to determine the number of times and the
purposes for which eminent domain has been used across the nation because of a lack of centralized
or aggregate data.").
166. Shavell suggests that governments might generally be inclined to take property less often
than is optimal, but he advances that suggestion as an argument against the "fiscal illusion" concern
about excessive takings. His discussion does not consider the possibility that removing
compensation might amplify any such tendency to take too infrequently. SHAVELL, supra note 4, at
129-30.
167. Calandrillo notes this possibility in passing but seems to discount its significance for
unstated reasons. Calandrillo, supra note 34, at 515 n.331; see also Farber, supra note 17, at 295
("The same is true of insurance companies, which could be expected to lobby hard against the losses
covered by their policies. If anything, these groups might be even more effective as lobbyists than
the individual property owners, since they are repeat players.").
168. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 17, at 289 ("Ifpublic choice has any one key finding, it is that
small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political process.");
Saul Levmore, The Public Choice Threat, 67 U. Cm. L. REv. 941, 948 (2000) (reviewing ROBERT
D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITmON (2000) and DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1996)) (explaining "public choice" and "special interest" models in relation to
legislation); see also Dagan, supra note 51, at 754 (suggesting that "strong potentially injured parties
exert more pressure on the public authority than people who belong to marginal groups or to the
nonorganized public").
169. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 17, at 284 (arguing that "[p]rivate insurers might in fact be
more capable of taking precautions against takings than individual citizens" because they are better
able to "overcome free-rider and other organizational problems"). Lobbying might not be the limit
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Moreover, private companies often directly benefit from the exercise of
eminent domain, and their decisions about property obviously are not made
independently of fiscal considerations, even if the government's decisions
are. (Indeed, the responsiveness of private actors to fiscal considerations is
the very foundation of the "moral hazard" argument.) Historically, one
prominent use of eminent domain was to enable large private businesses to
accumulate land that was needed for their operations. Thus, in the nineteenth
century, states often delegated their eminent domain power to railroads and
canal companies to use in building transportation networks. 17 0 Similarly, in
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, states have delegated their eminent
domain power to public utilities."' And the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Kelo v. New London"7 2 upheld the constitutionality of using
eminent domain to transfer property to private businesses as part of a
government plan to promote economic development.1 73
In all of these cases, the companies that benefited from the exercise of
eminent domain were, of course, obligated to pay compensation for the
property that they obtained by using this delegated power.1 74 However, if the
government's obligation to pay compensation for taken property were
removed, leaving burdened owners to rely on private insurance to alleviate
their losses, then socially inefficient ventures would become much more
attractive to companies that did not have to pay for the property required to
of insurance companies' actions. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky suggest that if private
insurance replaced public compensation for takings, then "[i]nsurance companies who stand to lose
from certain takings might exert improper influence on governmental decisions, by means of
political contributions or bribes, in order to increase their revenues or minimize their losses."
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 310 (2001).
170. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTIvrlONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 76 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that "state governments ... aggressively
us[ed] eminent domain power to promote transportation projects" in the nineteenth century). These
delegations occurred even before the Constitution's enactment. See id. ("As early as 1786, South
Carolina conferred the power of eminent domain on the Santee Canal Company to obtain land and
materials for the construction of the canal."); see also Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406
(1879) ("The property may be appropriated by an act of the legislature, or the power of appropriating
it may be delegated to private corporations, to be exercised by them in the execution of works in
which the public is interested.").
171. See, e.g., IA NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03[3][b][i] (2018) (detailing the
delegation of eminent domain power to "public service corporations").
172. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
173. Id. at 475, 488. For an overview of the many private enterprises for which eminent domain
may be used, see 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.07 (2018).
174. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 107 (1999) (reporting that
a "large portion of nineteenth-century just compensation litigation ... involved corporate
defendants. Everyone expected that turnpike, canal, and railroad corporations, and usually
municipal corporations as well, would bear the costs of property acquired for their benefit").
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undertake them.175 Growing businesses that have been delegated the power
of eminent domain would then have a powerful incentive to exercise that
power to acquire property for ventures that otherwise would not have been
sufficiently profitable to be worth undertaking. 17 As a result, removing the
obligation to compensate for taken property would predictably increase the
frequency of inefficient land-use decisions by those private businesses.177
Furthermore, businesses would also have strong incentives to lobby
governments to undertake "economic development" projects-even if not
socially optimal-in which those businesses could participate, thereby
benefiting from the opportunity to acquire property through eminent domain
at no expense. Of course, since the incentive effects of pro-taking lobbying
by private beneficiaries of eminent domain and anti-taking lobbying by
insurance companies pull in opposite directions, these two distortions of
incentives might conceivably cancel each other out. However, such a result
would merely be a lucky coincidence. There is no obvious reason to think
that those distortions would in fact negate each other, much less that they
would reliably do so over time. And even if, by chance, they did happen to
cancel out, the resources spent in lobbying to reach that stalemate would still
be a direct social cost.178
IV. Conclusion
The argument in favor of replacing government compensation for taken
property with private insurance thus rests on an illusory economic
foundation. Considering all of the effects of such a change, and-crucially-
the likely size of each effect, shows that any efficiency gains from eliminating
175. Eliminating a business's obligation to compensate for property that it takes would decrease
the cost to the business of the project's inputs, and thus would increase the project's accounting
profitability. However, that elimination would have no effect on the total amount of wealth created
by the project-only its distribution-and thus would not affect its economic profitability (i.e., its
social efficiency). For a textbook discussion of the distinction between accounting profit and
economic profit, see PAUL HEYNE ET AL., THBE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 166-68 (11th ed.
2006).
176. More precisely, they would have an even greater incentive than they already have to profit
from the use of eminent domain as a substitute for negotiated purchases. Even when compensation
is owed, that incentive may exist See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1641, 1717 (2011) (noting that "it is often less expensive for an assembler to convince a local
government to exercise eminent domain on its behalf than to purchase the parcels in the real estate
market").
177. One might try to avoid this result by eliminating the compensation requirement only for
takings that the government does directly, rather than takings by private entities to whom the
government has delegated its taking power. However, neither the moral hazard argument nor the
administrative-costs argument for eliminating the compensation requirement draw any distinction
between direct takings and delegated takings. Both types of taking have the same effect on
incentives to improve property and both incur the same administrative costs. Hence, this response
would require substantial revision of the anti-compensation thesis.
178. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV.
191, 228-34 (2012) (summarizing the social costs of lobbying).
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government compensation for takings would most likely be negligible at best,
and might even be negative. But the anti-compensation thesis has an even
more fundamental flaw: it misunderstands the basic nature of takings
compensation. "Just" compensation is not reducible to the instrumental
promotion of other goods, such as economically efficient maximization of
social wealth. Instead, the government's compensating for property that it
takes has an intrinsic value that is inextricably tied to the legitimacy of the
power of eminent domain, a connection that springs from the particular
relationships that exist between property owners and the rest of the
community. Requiring the government to pay compensation for what it takes
is thus fundamentally different from the provision of insurance against
takings losses, and attempting to substitute private insurance for government
compensation would neither improve social efficiency nor satisfy the
requirements of relational justice.

